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The dissertation at hand is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 presents an impact evaluation 
of a widely spread conditional cash transfer in Brazil called “Bolsa Família”. We analyze the 
impacts of the program on two educational outcomes: enrollment and attendance. In our analysis 
we consider the heterogeneous effects of the program. Chapter 2 and 3 study the influence of 
leaders’ identity on the group dynamics. Chapter 2 focuses on the effect of leaders’ identity on 
cooperation while Chapter 3 studies the dynamics of embezzlement or what we call elite capture.   
Chapter 1 conducts an impact evaluation of Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program “Bolsa 
Família”. The program provides grants to households below the poverty line conditioned to 
school attendance and medical care.  Reaching more than 13 million families, this is one of the 
biggest programs of its kind in the world. Yet research on its impact is limited. To deal with the 
non-experimental nature of the program we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The use of an 
ample Brazilian household survey - Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílio (PNAD) - 
makes it possible to match beneficiaries and non beneficiaries on a large set of observable 
characteristics. In this way we are able to present convincing causal inference. Moreover, thanks 
to the richness of the data set, we can study the impacts of the Program by age, gender and 
regions. Our results point to a significant increase in Enrollment rates and Attendance among 
recipients. Furthermore, when different groups and regions are compared, we find that recipients 
in less developed regions benefited more from program participation than groups in less 
developed regions, indicating that the program was able to close the gap in education between 
more and less developed areas.  
Chapter 2 studies the effect of leader's identity on cooperation. Due to the increasing demands of 
more competitive markets traditional producer cooperative leaders often need to be replaced by 
managers with specialized skills. While managers can bring technical expertise that leads to 
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better economic outcomes, the loss in representativeness of members’ interest might risk the 
sustainability of the organization.     
Using a laboratory experiment, we test the impact of leader's skills and identity on groups’ 
cooperation.  Our design uses a three stage procedure in groups formed by 4 subjects.  In the first 
stage we generate identity in the lab allowing participants to interact for 10 minutes while 
solving a joint task and competing with other groups. The second stage is instrumental and is 
designed to measure participant's ability in a real effort task. The last stage consists on a 
modified public good game in which participants have to decide which proportion of their 
endowment they allocate to the group account and the individual account. Investments in the 
individual account are multiplied by 1 while investments in the group account are multiplied by a 
factor M<1 that is an increasing function of the leader's outcome of a real-effort game.  The more 
the Leader works, the higher the multiplier, M. In the experiment we use a 2X2 design that 
combines two levels of skills of the leaders and shared or non-shared identity of the leader and 
the group members.  Our hypothesis is that leaders who share the same identity as the group 
members are more motivated and work harder in the real effort task than out-side leaders. We 
expect that group members will anticipate it and contribute less when led by an out-side leader 
than by an inside leader.  Leaders with higher skills are expected to perform better in the real 
effort task and hence attract more cooperation.  However it is not clear whether the gains of 
higher skills are negatively affected by the lack of identity of the out-side leader.    
 Our findings show that the lack of identity decreases leaders’ productivity, while members 
successfully anticipate it and cooperate significantly less. When leaders’ skills and social identity 
are directly compared, we find that the gains in cooperation levels due to leaders’ skills, is just 
enough to make up for the loss in identity. We do find, however, that out-group skilled leaders 
were able to sustain cooperation over time, while groups led by random in-group presented a 
continuous cooperation decrease over time.  
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Chapter 3 analyses a negative aspect of social identity. Small communities in developing 
countries (such as tribes, smallholders’ association and cooperatives for example), who share 
language, ethnicity and culture, are often inclined to suffer from an abusive behavior from their 
local leaders. This abusive behavior often occurs during long periods of time becoming even 
close to be an accepted political norm. In Chapter 3 we question if the high social identity 
condition in the community can be the cause of abusive behavior being hence the trigger to a 
perpetuation mechanism of power abuse in the community. We investigate two channels of how 
such a perpetuation mechanism can occur: trust and willingness to monitor. We hypothesize that 
groups who share the same identity with the leader trust him more, and would hence be less 
willing to pay for a monitoring mechanism. As trust decreases scrutiny, leaders would feel free 
to increase embezzlement. 
To do that, we present a laboratory experiment where groups formed by three subjects playing a 
three-stages game. In stage one subjects solved a group task similar to the group task presented 
in Chapter 2. In stage two, one subject was randomly assigned as group leader and other two 
subjects as group members. To allow members’ payoff to be dependent on leaders’ performance, 
we implemented the effort task followed by a trust game. The effort task was to sum 5 two digit 
numbers during 30 seconds. A minimal performance of 1 correct sum by the leader generated a 
multiplier A which would take a value between 0.8 and 1.9. The non-achievement of the 
minimal performance would set A=0.8. Members received 20 points as endowment, which they 
could decide to keep, where it would be multiplied by 1, or to pass it to the leader, where it 
would be multiplied by A. Leaders received a fixed amount of 20 points plus the amount of 
points leaders decided to take from each group member. In stage three subjects played a lottery 
game. We use a 2X2 design combining in- and out-group treatments with monitoring and 
without monitoring possibility.  
Introduction 
4 
Our findings show that members led by in-group leaders were less willing to monitor while this 
lack of scrutiny significantly increased amount captured. We did not however find that trust by 
itself is significantly higher in homogenous groups, which questions the identity as a cause of 








Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil:  Treatment Evaluation of the “Bolsa 






Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil:  Treatment Evaluation of the “Bolsa 
Família” Program on Education 
 
Elke Schaffland 1 
CRC-Poverty, Equity and Growth, 
University of Göttingen 
Abstract 
Brazil’s “Bolsa Família” conditional cash transfer program (BFP) serves as a substantial 
poverty alleviation program in Brazil. It is the biggest program of its kind in the world, 
reaching more than 13,000,000 families. The BFP awards grants to eligible poor families, 
allowing increased consumption in the short-term, while building human capital in the long-
term through requirements for school attendance and health care. In this paper, we evaluate 
the effect of this program on educational outcomes. In particular we study heterogeneous 
treatment effects over age, region, gender and setting (rural/urban). Using Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM), we find that the probability of school enrollment rises by around 4 
percentage points for recipient children. We find that this enrollment effect is higher for 
children living in less developed regions. In North/Northeast and in rural areas enrollment 
rates increase up to 5 and 7% respectively for beneficiaries of the program. Our results also 
point to a positive impact on school attendance with recipients missing 0.3 school days less 
in the last two months than non-recipient.  
 
Keywords: conditional cash transfers, propensity score matching, education 
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Since 2001 Brazil has undertaken a series of policies to decrease inequality and improve human 
development indicators.  One of these policies is the “Bolsa Família Program” (BFP, previous to 
2004 known as “Bolsa Escola”), a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program which has 
benefited about 13,000,000 families to date. The objectives of the program are two-fold. First, in 
the short-run, by directly transferring cash to recipient families, the program attempts to increase 
income, boost consumption and alleviate poverty. Second, in the long-run, through 
conditionalities attached to education and health, it attempts to increase human capital and 
consequently break the inter-generational cycle of poverty. Despite being the biggest program of 
its kind in the world, few studies have analyzed its impact. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of BFP on two educational outcomes: 
enrollment and attendance.  Our study uses country-wide micro data which, by providing a rich 
set of variables, allows us to construct a high-quality counterfactual group using Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM).  We are also able to provide an overall impact assessment analyzing 
heterogeneous treatment effects across age, gender, locality and region (rural, urban).  
Cash transfer programs have been exhaustively analyzed in Central and Latin America. For 
instance, it has been shown that PROGRESA, a social program in Mexico rolled out in a 
randomized fashion, has had positive effects on education through increasing enrollment and test 
scores while decreasing dropout and repetition rates (Behrman et al., 2005 and 2000; Schultz, 
2004).  It has also been shown to serve as a safety net for education among the poor (de Janvry, 
2006b). Other CCTs programs in Latin America had positive effects in education.  In Nicaragua 
school enrollment increased by 13 percent (Maluccio and Flores, 2005) in addition to language 
and personal behavioral skills improving (Macours et al., 2008). In Honduras, school enrollment 
rose by 3 percent (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004), in Ecuador by 10 percent for recipients in the first 
income quintile (Schady and Araujo, 2008; Oosterbeek et al., 2008) but had no effect on test 
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scores. Ponce and Bedi (2008) and Levy and Ohls (2010) find that, for recipient children, there is 
an increase of 0.5 days per month in attendance.  
Fewer empirical studies consider the Brazilian CCT. Barros et al. (2006) estimated a program 
response of up to 20 – 25 percent reduction in inequality, and a 16 percent decrease in extreme 
poverty between 2001 and 2005. By using a micro-econometric simulation Bourguignon et al. 
(2003) estimate that 60% of poor children aged between 10 and 15 enroll in school due to 
program participation. Using PSM, Cardoso and Souza (2004) analyze the “Bolsa Escola” 
program utilizing the 2000 census data. They find that children beneficiaries of the program were 
3 to 4 percentage points more likely to go to school than a comparable group of non-
beneficiaries. De Janvry et al. (2006a) analyze the impact of “Bolsa Escola”, finding an overall 
reduction of 8 percentage points in the dropout rate of recipients in northeastern States. 
Nevertheless, the decreased dropout followed by an increase of 0.8% in the failure rate. This 
effect is explained due the targeting characteristics of the program, which is able to maintain 
drop-out threatened children in school but who also present lower motivation and skills to finish 
the school year. Similarly, using school level data, Glewwe and Kassouf (2008) find a reduction 
of 8 percentage points in the dropout rate in primary schools. Oliveira et al. (2007) covers a 
country-wide effect at the individual level and confirms findings from previous studies on the 
positive effects of BFP on school attendance, as well as a lower proportion of children dropping 
out.  However, they find a negative effect of BFP on successful completion of the school year.  
One drawback of these studies is that the analysis on heterogeneous effects is limited. We 
believe that knowing how programs affects different groups is essential for policy makers in 
particular for targeting strategies. For instance, is the grant by itself enough to incentivize 
childrens’ enrollment in areas where access to school is restricted (e.g. rural areas)?  Is the grant 
able to bring boys at working age back to school? Furthermore, we are interested in the regional 
disparities in Brazil. The country presents high heterogeneity across regions with regard to 
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poverty and development indicators. This disparity is in line with the development indicators. 
While the Human Development Index (HDI) of the whole country was 0.803 in 2006, the HDIs 
of the North and Northeast were 0.733 and 0.772, respectively. The South, Southeast and 
Midwest presented significantly higher development indicators, at 0.837, 0.835 and 0.824, 
respectively (BCB, 2009). Based on this heterogeneity, is “Bolsa Família” able to overcome 
regional inequalities?  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses on the heterogeneous impacts of 
the BFP across locations, regions and age groups.  We confirm previous findings regarding the 
positive impact on educational output. The probability of enrollment rises by around 4 
percentage points for recipient children aged between 6 and 17 in 2006. On school attendance, 
beneficiary children miss around 0.3 less days of school (during the preceding two months) when 
compared to non-beneficiaries. Additionally, we find that the BFP's impact is higher in poorer 
locations (North and Northeast) and rural areas.  Despite the positive impacts of the program, we 
find that the impact of the program on the enrollment and attendance outcomes slightly fell by 1 
percent between the years of 2004 and 2006.  
1.1.1 The Bolsa Família Program 
The BFP gives monthly grants to each child of poor families, as well as a basic grant to families 
living in extreme poverty (currently with per capita income (PCI) less than $70 BRL ($ ~31 
USD)). There are three kinds of benefits which are distributed based on the level of poverty, 
number of children and the age of the children. The “basic benefit” assigns $70 BRL a month to 
families in extreme poverty. The “variable benefit” grants poor families $32 BRL (~$14 USD) 
for each child aged between 0 and 15 and the “teenager benefit” grants children between 16 and 
17 years old who attend school $38 BRL (~$ 17 USD).  
Once in the program, the family receives a grant for all its children. The participation is 
conditional on at least 85% school attendance for children between the ages of 6 to 15. For 
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children of ages 16 and 17, the attendance obligation for recipients falls to 75%. Regarding 
medical care, parents are obligated to allow children to get required vaccines until they turn 6, as 
well as prenatal medical assistance and breast feeding mothers. 
The cash transfer is granted for the household, and not at the individual level. Therefore, once in 
a beneficiary household, all children are bounded to the school attendance conditionality. 
However, a teenager who has already turned 16 has the right to abdicate his grant and therefore 
does not need to meet the conditionality if he decides to work instead of study.  
Despite the existence of the proxy means test which targets eligible families with per capita 
income below R$ 140, some evidence point that it was not tightly administered during the 
analyzed period (Handa and Davis, 2006). Changes in the state of poverty were not checked 
which made exclusion of ineligibles rare; income is self-reported and poorly checked while 
income from informal work cannot be traced. In 2004, three different programs called “Bolsa 
Escola”, “Bolsa Alimentação” and “Auxílio Gás”  were integrated and called “Bolsa Família”, 
while recipients did not passed through eligibility checks. Moreover, its institutional framework 
is decentralized at municipality system, permitting regional disparities in targeting and 
monitoring.  
1.2 Impact Evaluation: Concepts and method 
When analyzing policy measures with non-experimental studies, we would ideally look at how a 
non-treated individual would perform if the same individual would have received treatment. 
However, there is no possibility of observing this effect for the same person, i.e., once with 
treatment and once without. This problem can be solved by searching a comparable 
counterfactual group, whose only difference is the participation in the program.  
In cases such as the “Bolsa Família”, where the proxy means test were not tightly administered 
and take-up is less than 100%, the probability increases of having eligible’s which should be 
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treated, but aren’t, while non-eligible’s which shouldn’t be treated, are in fact receiving the 
benefit. In these cases where contamination between treated and non-treated is eminent, 
Propensity Score Matching is a particularly appropriate methodology, due to a higher likelihood 
of finding comparable households with same income and households characteristics, but differ 
about treatment status.2  
PSM creates the counterfactual group based on a probability of receiving treatment, this 
probability being determined by a set of characteristics, the so called propensity score 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The estimated coefficients are then used to predict the individual 
probability (propensity) of being beneficiary of the program. In the second stage treated 
individuals will be matched to non-treated individuals that present the same or similar propensity 
score. Hence PSM is able to replicate an experimental data set by finding a non-treated 
observation that presents the same propensity score and is hence comparable to a treated one. 
Once a non-treated individual fulfills the same characteristics as the treated one, treatment 
effects are measured by differences in means in the outcome between both groups.  
The validity of the method is conditional on two assumptions. The Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) or balancing property certifies that the vector of explained variables X fully 
determines the participation rule regarding treated and non-treated outcome, hence being able to 
overcome treatment selection bias. Thus, after controlling for Xs, we can say that the outcome of 
individuals without treatment is independent of their participation status. This condition 
guarantees that treated and non-treated individuals are comparable to each other, assuring that 
the CIA holds. The second condition is called Overlap (or common support) condition and 
certifies that for each characteristic X, there are individuals from the treated and non-treated 
group, indicating an overlapping trend between both hence allowing their direct comparison.  
                                                 
2 We do, however, also consider using Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) but did not find any discontinuity 
around the income threshold of the means test, turning  RDD unsuitable. 
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Once the propensity score is calculated, matching is performed based on fitting weights assigned 
to the neighborhood of the probability of being treated. After the weights are applied on the 
control group, the matching estimator is calculated on the difference between treated and non-
treated. Conditional on the assumptions above, the matching estimator is then:  
?̂? 𝑀 = ∑ {𝑦𝑖 − ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑦i𝑗𝜖𝐶 }𝑤𝑖𝑖𝜖𝑇 , where T and C stand for the treatment and control group, i for 
the treated individuals in the treatment group T, j for non-treated individuals in the control group 
C, ?̃?𝑖𝑗 for the weights on j for group i, while 𝑤𝑖 stands for the reweighting that is needed to build 
the distribution for the beneficiary group.  
1.2.1 Dataset 
In the analysis we use data of the annual national household survey (Pesquisa Nacional de 
Amostra de Domicilios – PNAD). In 2004 the PNAD covered 399,354 individuals and 139,157 
households while in 2006 the PNAD included 410,241 individuals and 145,547 households. Both 
covered  all 27 Brazilian states. For our analysis, we focus on school children aged between 6 
and 17.  
1.3 Application and Findings 
We implemented a probit model in order to calculate the probability of being a “Bolsa Família” 
recipient. Since our intention is not to estimate selection into treatment but instead use it as a 
simplifying tool for the multidimensionality problem we follow the recommendation of  Rubin 
and Thomas (1996) and included all variables which, despite having a questionable level of 
significance and respective importance, are able to provide a better fit. The model was calculated 
with the psmatch2 command following Leuven and Sianesi (2003) and included  71 variables on 
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assets, child characteristics, household head characteristics, mothers’ characteristics and 
household characteristics.3  
Table 1.1: Balancing Results – Key Variables 
    Mean     T-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % reduct bias t-value p-value 
Asset Index Unmatched -1.13 0.11 -92.1  -128.86 0.00 
 Matched -1.13 -1.22 6.4 93.1 7.24 0.00 
Black Unmatched 0.07 0.06 4.1  5.88 0.00 
 Matched 0.07 0.07 -0.9 78.2 -1.06 0.29 
Years of education of household head Unmatched 4.63 7.87 -82.4  -111.53 0.00 
 Matched 4.62 4.58 1.1 98.7 1.58 0.12 
Number of household members Unmatched 5.76 4.63 58.3  85.46 0.00 
 Matched 5.76 5.74 0.9 98.5 0.95 0.34 
Number of children Unmatched 3.26 2.25 68.5  101.18 0.00 
 Matched 3.26 3.28 -1.3 98.1 -1.36 0.17 
Year of the oldest child Unmatched 13.42 12.84 17.9  24.61 0.00 
  Matched 13.42 13.39 0.9 94.7 1.19 0.23 
Source: PNAD 2006 – pstest output 
A sample on balancing test with some key variables is presented in Table 1.1 (see whole 
balancing test in Appendix 1.1, One to One matching). The test shows a t-test for the equality of 
the means of treated and non-treated, before and after matching, present the standardized bias, 
and the percentage of bias reduction. It is possible to observe that for most of the variables, the 
difference becomes not significantly different after matching. Furthermore, the percentage of 
bias reduction is high, indicating that for the broader majority, the balancing condition holds.4  
Table 1.2 shows the result on the common support condition. Column 1 present the number of 
observations out of common support and Column  2 present observations within common 
                                                 
3 Variables used: asset index (polychoric PCA (Olsson, 1979), included variables by request) race (four dummies for 
being indigenous, black, asian or mixed race/mulatto), age, birth registered, head age and head age squared, the 
interaction of head age and eligibility, head is literate, head is female, education years of the household head (linear 
and squared), and type of work executed by the head (In the agriculture, processing, construction, commerce, food, 
transport, public service, social service, and domestic industries, as well as other industry,  services,  work and 
undefined groups. mother alive, mother lives in the household, 26 state dummies, 8 rural/urban dummies, 2 area 
dummies (slums and indigenous villages), number of children, number of members in household, age of the oldest 
child. Even though we recognize its importance, we weren’t able to introduce municipality dummies in the PSM, 
since the IBGE (Brasilian institute of geography and statistics) strictly prohibit the access to the id code at this level. 
4Some variables are not balanced however. Instead, they even present an increase in estimation bias. For a 
robustness check, we run the estimations without variables that can over- or underestimate our results, such as the 
ones presenting a high percentage of bias increase (indian, female head, some area and state dummies, for example) 
and even the asset index, since after matching, the control group is significantly poorer than treated. We find no 
substantial differences in our estimates, however. The effect of the treatment varies ± 0.5% in response to these 
robustness checks, while the exclusion of the asset index slightly decrease treatment effect on 1%. We therefore 
decide to include all variables considered important, mainly because they represent a low percentage of the bias and 
are considered to be important for the fit.  
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support area by treatment for the year 2006. For the total sample analysis, we will work with 
85,854 observations, with 55,903 untreated and 29,951 treated children aged between 6 and 17. 
The common support condition holds for all other sub samples. Regarding the concern expressed 
by Bryson et al. (2002) overparameterizing barely constrained the common support area. For 
results of common support by sub-samples, see Appendix 1.1.  
Table 1.2: Common Support Results – Complete Dataset 
 off Support on Support Total 
Complete Sample (6 - 17 years old)    
Untreated 1,657 55,903 57,560 
Treated 27 29,951 29,978 
Total 1,684 85,854 87,538 
Teenager Sample (10-15 years old)    
Untreated 1,704 26,815 28,519 
Treated 14 16,024 16,038 
Total 1,718 42,839 44,557 
Children (6-9 years old)    
Untreated 979 17,885 18,864 
Treated 29 9,960 9,989 
Total 1,008 27,845 28,853 
 Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations (psmatch2 output) 
 
We use four matching algorithms: One-to-one matching (OO), nearest neighbor (NN), caliper 
and Kernel.5 One-to-one matching consigns a weight of 1 if the score of the treated individual is 
the most nearby standing neighbor to the non-treated individual, and zero otherwise. Radius 
matching was proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and is a modification of caliper matching 
where the counterfactual is in one particular range of the propensity score. The Radius matching 
consists of using the set of individuals in the control group within the caliper. Kernel matching 
calculates weights according to the distance in the propensity scores between treated and non-
treated individuals, where the weight assigned to the treated individual tends to be closer to one 
as the Kernel function draws nearer to the matched individual, while it falls as the propensity 
score of the matched observation becomes more distant. The implementation of all the three 
methods provides us with robust treatment effects. For one-to-one matching, the counterfactual 
                                                 
5 Results for Kernel analyzes were only reported for the sub-sample analysis. Local linear analyzes were also used 
but are not reported, since estimators rarely present big differences between matching methods overall. 
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group was constructed with replacement; for nearest neighbor matching, we use five nearest 
neighbors; we used a caliper of 0.01 for the Radius matching, and for Kernel matching and local 
linear matching, the bandwidth is 0.06.  
1.4 Findings 
1.4.1 Impacts between 2004 and 2006 
We evaluate the educational impact of the program on two different variables: enrollment and 
attendance.  We compare the effect of the program at two different points of time, 2004 and 
2006.  
Table 1.1 shows the enrollment rates by year and treatment, as well as the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) on enrollment for the complete sample of children aged between 6 
and 17.  In 2004 and 2006, the percentage of children enrolled was 92.96% and 93.12%, 
respectively. The BFP had a positive impact on human capital investments; beneficiary children 
were 4.7% to 4.5% more likely to be enrolled in 2006.  In 2004, the impact of the program on 
enrollment was even larger and children beneficiaries of the program were 5.6% to 5% more 
likely to be enrolled in the school. While the overall enrollment rates slightly improved between 
2004 and 2006, the treatment effect of the program fell by half to one percent point depending on 
the matching indicator which might indicate that the effect of the cash transfer faded over time.   
Table 1.3: Effects on Enrollment: 2004 and 2006 
BFP effect on enrollment 
Matching method  
2004 2006 2004/2006 
92.96 % 93.12 % -0.16% 
  treated controls diff s.e. t-stat treated controls diff s.e. t-stat diff   t-stat 
Unmatched 94.33% 93.85% 0.48% 0 2.33 93.15% 93.46% -0.31% 0 -1.74 1.18% 
  OO 94.33% 88.73% 5.60% 0 14.28 93.15% 88.47% 4.68% 0 13.04 0.92% ** 1.73 
NN  94.33% 89.26% 5.07% 0 17.54 93.15% 88.65% 4.51% 0 16.4 0.57% * 1.42 
Radius 94.33% 89.28% 5.06% 0 20.39 93.15% 88.50% 4.65% 0 19.4 0.41%   1.18 
Source: PNAD (IBGE, 2004 and 2006), own calculation 
Table 1.4  shows the results for school attendance two months previous to the survey, in 2004 
and 2006. It is possible to observe that BFP has a positive and significant impact on attendance; 
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children missed 0.35 fewer days over the last two months or about 2.1 days less accumulated. 
When both years are compared, we find that school attendance slightly increased over time and 
children missed 0.41 days less in 2004 compared with 2006, while the effect of BFP on 
attendance stayed constant over the two years analyzed.  
Table 1.4: Effects on Attendance (Schooldays missed): 2004 and 2006 
BFP effect on  attendance 
Matching 
2004 2006 2004/2006 
2.28 1.87 0.41 
treated Controls diff s.e. t-stat treated Controls diff s.e. t-stat diff t-stat 
Unmatched 2.51 2.26 0.25 0.05 4.73 1.86 1.70 0.16 0.03 5.79       
OO 2.51 2.85 -0.34 0.10 -3.58 1.86 2.15 -0.28 0.06 -5.05 -0.06   -0.51 
NN  2.51 2.87 -0.36 0.07 -4.83 1.86 2.21 -0.35 0.04 -8.03 -0.01   -0.51 
Radius 2.51 2.86 -0.36 0.07 -5.44 1.86 2.19 -0.32 0.04 -8.27 -0.04   -0.46 
Source: PNAD (IBGE, 2004 and 2006), own calculation  
1.5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
While finding an overall effect of “Bolsa Família”, we are also interested in impact differences 
between age groups, regions, genders and areas (rural/urban). To estimate the impact of the 
program on different groups we first constructed the counterfactual within the respective sub-
sample and performed the matching on the observations of the sub-sample. The next section 
presents the impacts of the program for different groups in 2006 (see Appendix 1.2 for overview 
of the heterogeneous effects in 2004). 
Table 1.5 presents the average treatment effects of the treated ATT for different groups. We find 
that there are no significant differences in enrollment rates or attendance between boys and girls 
beneficiaries of the program when compared with the control group (t-stat: 0.72 and 1.14 
respectively for the OO, see Appendix 1.3)6.  
 
 
                                                 








Table 1.5: Impact of the Program by Group 7 
  Enrollment Attendence 
Group OO NN Radious Kernel OO NN Radious Kernel 
Gender  
Males 4.80%*** 4.38%*** 4.37%*** 4.36%*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.34*** -0.33*** 
Females 4.28%*** 4.11%*** 4.22%*** 4.22%*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.29*** -0.27*** 
Diff 0.52% 0.27% 0.15% 0.14% -0.13 -0.13* -0.06 -0.06 
Age Group 
6-9 years 4.02%*** 3.83%*** 3.68%***   -0.54*** -0.45*** -0.38***   
10 - 17 years 4.26%*** 4.15%*** 4.03%***   -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28***   
Diff 0.24% 0.32% 0.35%   -0.27*** -0.18** -0.10   
Location  
North 3.70%*** 3.77%*** 4.19%*** 4.17%*** -0.26 -0.22 -0.21 -0.24 
North-East 4.32%*** 5.03%*** 5.27%*** 5.23%*** -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 
South-East 1.98%*** 2.39%*** 2.40%*** 2.39%*** -0.32 -0.29 -0.29 -0.28 
South  1.20% 2.09%*** 2.06%*** 2.02%*** -0.14 -0.21 -0.14 -0.11 
Midwest 1.05% 2.58%*** 2.75%*** 2.61%*** 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.16 
Diff to South-East                 
North 1.73%* 1.38%* 1.79%** 1.78%** 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.05 
North-East 1.98%*** 2.39%*** 2.40%*** 2.39%*** 0.1*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
South   0.78%  0.30%  0.34%  0.37%  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08  -0.05 
Midwest  0.93%  -0.19%  -0.35%  -0.22%   -0.10 0.06  0.05  0.03 
Region 
Urban 3.28%*** 3.55%*** 3.50%*** 3.41%*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
Rural 5.91%*** 5.65%*** 5.51%*** 5.49%*** -0.73*** -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.61*** 
Diff 2.63%*** 2.10%*** 2.01%*** 2.08%*** -0.63*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.52*** 
Source PNAD (IBGE 2006) – own calculations 
Ttest results: *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
We compare the effect of the program for two age groups. The first group is composed of 
younger children who are between 6 and 9 years old while the second group is children between 
10 and 17 years. We find that both older and younger children have a 4% higher probability of 
being enrolled when treated than the comparable group.  However we do not find significant 
differences between both groups.  
Program participation also has a positive effect on attendance. Depending on the matching 
estimator used, we find that younger children miss between 0.38 and 0.54 days less when treated 
than the comparable group.  For teenagers, the effect is also positive; they missed around 0.27 
less days of school than the counterfactual group. Furthermore, we find that younger children 
miss 0.2 days of school less than older children. This difference is significant at 1 and 5 
percentage level (t-stat: 2.33 and 1.96 respectively, see Appendix 1.4). 
                                                 
7 For detailed overview of the results see Appendix 1.3, Appendix 1.4 and Appendix 1.5. 
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We turn now to the analysis on the regional disparities of Brazil. While the South-East (SE) 
region is the most populated, urbanized and industrialized region (strongly driven by its two 
biggest cities Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), the Northeast (NE) is characterized by a semi-arid 
climate and an economy driven mainly by tourism and antiquated agriculture. While the 
Midwest (MW) is also characterized by its predominantly agricultural activities, modern 
technology and low population density distinguish it from the Northeast. In general, the North 
(N) is mainly covered by Amazonian forests, while the ecology of the South (S) allows 
diversified activities from agriculture to industry, and is overall more developed than the other 
regions, in particular to the North and Northeast. Under this country feature we will now analyze 
the heterogeous impacts of the program took place over the regions.  
Overall, we find a significant positive effect of cash transfers on enrollment in all regions. In the 
North, recipients had a 4% higher probability of being enrolled than non-beneficiaries. 
Additionally, this number was 5% in the Northeast, and around 2% in the South-East, South and 
Midwest. We did not find positive effects on attendance. 
When we compare the effect of the program with respect to the South East region, one of the 
most developed regions of the country, we find that the effect of the program in the North is 
around 1.7 percentage points higher than when compared to the SE; moreover, this comparison 
achieves up to 2.4 percentage points higher enrollment rates for the NE when compared to the 
SE. This difference is statistically significant for the comparisons SE-N and SE-NE (t-test 
between 1.57 and 2.4 for the SE-N comparison and 2.53 and 4.57 for the SE-NE comparison). 
Yet we do not find any differences when the SE region is compared to more developed region, 
such as the South and the Midwest. Notwithstanding were the results on attendance, where the 
difference among regions were not present. Nonetheless, the results presented here provide some 
evidence that cash transfers have been able to mitigate the gap between regions, while it is higher 
in less developed regions than in more developed ones. This convergence effect might be 
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explained by lower initial enrollment in the North and Northeast region, which stayed at 91,45% 
and 92,76% respectively, when compared to the Southeast region (94,45%). 
We also found that the effect of BFP varies across areas - while it increases enrollment in rural 
areas by around 5.5 %, while it is estimated to be about 3.5 % in urban areas for treated children. 
The two percentage points difference between rural and urban areas is significant for all 
matching estimators. We also find significant differences on attendance. The effect of BFP on 
comparable recipients in rural areas is significantly higher than in urban areas. Rural recipients 
miss, on average, 0.5 less days than comparable recipients in urban areas.  
Just as before we find evidence supporting the positive effect of the program to overcome 
differences between regions and promote convergence in school enrollment. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we used Propensity Score Matching to evaluate the impact of the biggest cash 
transfer program in the world, "Bolsa Familia Program".  We find that despite the lack of 
monitoring and enforceability of the conditions of this program during the analyzed period, it has 
a positive effect on human capital investments. Enrollment rates increases by four percentage 
points for children between the ages of 6 and 17, and estimates on attendance show that treated 
children miss 0.30 days of school less than untreated ones. Despite the positive effect of the 
program, we find that overtime the effect on enrollment slightly decreased by around 1% 
between 2004 and 2006.  We do not find significant differences on the effects of the program 
across gender or age groups.  One of the main achievements of “Bolsa Família” is its power to 
close the development gap between regions. Particularly the less developed in the North and 
North-East and the rural areas benefited more from the grants than the South and South-East and 
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Abstract 
In order to deal with crises, organizations often bring expert leaders from outside.  However, 
the lack of identification of the outside expert and the members of the organization can result 
in decreased performance of the organization.  Using an experiment to investigate the role of 
identity and skills of the outside leader on the performance of the organization, we find that 
outside leaders are less committed than inside leaders which can motivate a decrease in 
cooperation. While leader’s skills mitigate this effect, members of the organization fail to 
recognize it. Hence the gains in productivity that the skilled out-side leader bring are not 
enough to compensate the effect of their lack of identity with the organization.  
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Leaders affect the performance of organizations in various ways. For example, they help to 
overcome problems of asymmetric information by signaling the advantages of cooperation 
(Hermalin 1998, 2013). In organizations that maintain hierarchical institutions, leaders can 
discipline followers by imposing sanctions or providing rewards. In situations where there are 
multiple equilibria, leaders can help to coordinate actions (Van Huyck, et al. 1992; Weber et al. 
2001). Leaders can also motivate group members or help shape their institutional cultures 
(Schein 2004).  Most of all, leaders are productive assets and can affect the performance of their 
organizations through their dedication, effort and skills (Rosen 1982; Smith et al. 1984; Connelly 
et al. 2000).  At the same time, leaders are highly mobile and are often replaced.  For instance, 
political leaders are re-elected every four to six years; CEOs move to different posts, retire or are 
dismissed; and sport teams hire new coaches or change team captains. The replacement of 
leaders can rejuvenate an organization by bringing new ideas. Alternatively, replacement can 
help to discipline leaders to decreasing power abuse (Datta and Rajagopalan 1998; Ocasio 1994). 
Nonetheless, leader replacement could be damaging for an organization.  The lack of 
identification of the leader and members of an organization could lead to a decrease in 
performance.  The leader might feel as though they are a stranger to the organization, being less 
committed to work for it, while members of the organization might be less willing to cooperate 
with the outside leader.  These two effects could result in decreased organizational performance. 
Identity, or the process of self-categorization in which individuals subscribe emotional value to 
the group to which they feel identified with (Tajfel, 1974 and Turner, 1982), has been found to 
promote in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination (e.g. Akerlof and  Kranton  2000; 
Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Li et al.,2011; Eckel and 
Grossman 2005; Tremewan 2010).  Favoritism for in-group leaders has also been reported.  For 
instance, Platow et al. (1997), Platow and van Knippenberg (2001) and Haslam and Platow 
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(2001) show that in-group leaders receive more support and are perceived to be fairer than out-
group leaders.  Yet the effect of the leader's identity on the performance of the organization has 
seldom been considered. Few studies use observational data to study the effect of an outside 
leader on firm performance (e.g. Huson et al. 2004; Lauterbach et al. 1999; Shen and Canella  
2002; Zhang and Rajagopalan 2004).  The main problem of those studies is that it is difficult to 
disentangle the effects of identity as the replacement of leaders is not random.  Moreover, with 
this type of data, it is not possible to understand the channels by which identity affects 
performance. Laboratory experiments can overcome those limitations and provide valuable 
insights.  
This paper uses a highly simplified controlled experiment to explore the effect of identity and 
skills of the leader on the organization’s performance.  We consider a scenario common to most 
organizations in which the dedication and efforts of the leader affect the success of the 
organization.  For instance, the success of politicians in passing laws (or attract funding) depends 
on how hard they lobby the reforms among parliamentarians (donors). Similarly, the success of 
companies and producer groups depends on the ability of the leader to open new markets.  
Hence, in our experiment, we consider a modified public good game in which the marginal 
return from contributing to the public good depends on the productivity of the leaders in a real 
effort task.  In our experiment, we vary exogenously the identity of the leader allowing for the 
leader to be either part of the organization (in-group) or an outsider (out-group).  Furthermore, to 
account for the fact that in-group leaders might be less qualified that out-group leaders, we vary 
the skill level of the leader.  Hence, we compare the performance of the organization with 
randomly selected leaders versus leaders selected according to highest skill level.   In other 
words, we ask: Is it better to have a leader who identifies with the group he/she represents but 
who does not have the best qualification for the job, or a leader who is qualified for the job but is 
a stranger to the organization? Our hypothesis is that outside leaders who lacks identification 
with the members of the organization, have lower inner motivation to work.  In turn, group 
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members anticipate this and decrease support towards the outside leader.  These two forces lead 
to a decrease in the performance of the organization compared with an organization led by an 
inside leader.   
Experimental studies have examined how leaders affect group performance. For instance, it has 
been shown that the decision of the first player (leader) affects the decisions of the followers, 
inducing higher cooperation levels (Potters et al.  2005 and 2007; Clark and Sefton 2001; 
Moxnes and van der Heijden 2003; Meidinger and Villeval 2002). Furthermore, Gächter et al. 
(2010) and De Cremer and Knippenberg (2005) show that more cooperative leaders or leaders 
that incur larger sacrifices can lead the group to achieve more cooperative outcomes. Additional 
studies have shown that leaders can increase group cooperation by imposing sanctions or 
offering rewards to group members (van der Heijden, Potters, and Sefton 2009; Güth et al. 2007; 
Gürerk et al., 2009; Rivas and Sutter 2009; Levati et al. 2007; Glöckner et al. 2011).  In the 
framework of a coordination game as the weak link game, Brandts and Cooper (2007) and  
Brandts, et al. (2007) show that coordination traps can be avoided when someone acts as a leader 
and sets an example that pulls laggards after them.  In a different framework, Kuang, et al. 
(2007) show that the effectiveness of a leader to solve coordination problems depends on the 
leader's motives.  We make contributions to this area of research by focusing on the impact on 
the performance of the organization of a new type of leader: the productive leader.   
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers that study the effect of identity on group 
performance are De Cremer  Van Vugt and (1999) and De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002). 
However while they consider the question on how salience of group identity affects cooperation 
in a public good game and the effectiveness of leaders, these papers do not consider how the 
identity of a leader affects cooperation.  Unlike previous papers that use fictional leaders, in our 
experiment, the leader plays an active role so that we can track two forms of discrimination: 
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discrimination from group members against the out-group leader and discrimination from the 
out-group leader against group members.   
Experimental methods have previously been used to study organizational change.  For instance, 
Weber and Camerer (2003) and Weber et. al. (2001) investigate a merger failure. While they 
focus on differences in communication style (which are erroneously attributed to failure by the 
leader), we focus on a more general aspect of culture as is  identity or the feeling of being part of 
the organization. 
2.2 Experimental Design 
The experimental design is structured in three stages9. In the first stage, we induce identity.  At 
the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly divided into groups of four.  The 
groups could be one of two colors: green or blue.  While participants know their color, they do 
not know who is in their group as there is more than one group with the same color.  Participants 
were presented a picture and on the side a list of hidden objects within the picture. Their task was 
to find the hidden objects and to type the number of row and column where the object was found.  
While solving this task, participants were able to chat with other member of their group using a 
chat box.  In order to induce participants to cooperate, we explained that answers will be valid 
only if all four members of the group typed the correct answer.  Moreover, to make identity more 
salient, the task was played as a tournament where groups of different colors competed against 
each other. In order to avoid income effects, participants did not receive monetary incentives in 
this task.  Instead, winning groups received a congratulation message at the end of the session 
once the payout was announced.  Participants were given 10 minutes to solve the task.  By 
having a task in which participants solve a joint task, communicate and compete with others, we 
                                                 
9  Instructions can be provided upon request 
Chapter 2 
28 
expect to generate a strong form of identity (See Eckel and Grossman, 2005 and Chen and Li, 
2009).  
The second stage is instrumental and is used to classify participants according to the 
performance in a real effort task.  However, participants do not know this until the next stage 
once their task is over.  Using Gill and Prowse (2012) real effort tasks, participants had 60 
seconds to position up to 48 slides. Slides were positioned at zero and could be moved as far as 
100.  The task was to position the slide exactly at 50.  While solving the task, participants knew 
the exact location of each slide, how many slides they positioned correctly and how much time 
remained.  To avoid potential income effects, we did not use economic incentives in this task.     
In the third stage, participants played a modified public good game.  In the modified public 
good game, participants were assigned one of two roles: leader or group members.  Leadership 
roles were assigned either randomly or according to the performance in the second stage real 
effort task. The roles remained constant over the experiment. Leaders were presented the Gill 
and Prowse real effort task again and had 60 seconds to position slides.  Moreover, we explicitly 
provided them an outside option as all participants received a second picture with hidden objects. 
For each round, leaders received a fix payment of 25 points independently of the number of 
slides correctly positioned or the number of objects found in the picture (which is not 
recorded)10.   
Group members participated in a repeated modified public good game with random ending 
points between 10 and 15 periods. For each period, participants received 20 points of 
endowment, and their task was to distribute the endowment between a private and group 
account. Points invested in the private account returned 1 point, while points invested in the 
group account returned a<1 to all group members. The value of the multiplier, a, was 
determined according to the number of slides correctly positioned by the leader.  Table 2.1 
                                                 
10 Experimental points were transformed to Euros at an exchange rate of 100 points = 2.5 Euros.  
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shows the distribution of the correctly positioned slides by the leader and the corresponding 
value of the multiplier. While participants knew the return of the slides positioned by the leader, 
during the game, they did not know the exact number of slides correctly positioned.11  
Participants were paid according to the points earned over all periods. Table 2.1 shows the 
distribution of the correctly positioned sliders by the leader and the correspondent value of a.  
Only the leader knew the exact number of correctly positioned sliders. The modified public good 
game was played for t periods, where t was randomly chosen between 10 and 15. (see 
instructions in Appendix 2.4) 
Table 2.1: Multiplier  
Number of sliders correctly positioned by 
the leader 
Multiplier to each group member 
Less than 6 0.3 
Between 6 and 8 0.4 
Between 9 and 16 0.5 
Between 17 and 20 0.6 
More than 20 0.8 
 
Between each round, we elicited expectations from participants on the performance of the leader 
and from the leader on the expected contribution of group members.  Answers to expectations 
were incentivized.    
 Our experiment uses a 2x2 design that combines two different identities of the leader and two 
different selection mechanisms of the leader (see Table 2.2). In treatments one and three, leaders 
and group members share the same identity (belonging to the same group during the group 
identity induction stage), while in treatments two and four, leaders have a different identity than 
the group members (they did not belong to the same group in the group identity induction stage).  
In the first two treatments, leaders are randomly selected while in treatments three and four, the 
best participant in the second stage real effort task from each group is selected as a leader.12   
                                                 
11 Participants could have determined the value of the multiplier given that they received information on group 
contributions.     
12 To avoid strategic bias, participants did not know it. 
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Table 2.2: Treatments 
  Identity 
  In-group Out-group 
Selection of the 
leader 
Random Treat 1 Treat 2 
Skilled Treat 3 Treat 4 
 
The individual payoff function (Π) for the group member, i, and leader, L, and period, t, is given 
by: 
Πti  = (20 – cit) +  a(fLt) Ʃcit  , 
ΠtL  = 25 
Where, ci is the amount invested in the group account, fL is the number of slides correctly 
positioned by the leader and Ʃci is the total amount invested in group account by all group 
members. If the leader positions 6 slides or more, we have a social dilemma in which 
individually it is better to invest in the private account (a<1) but socially better to invest in the 
group account (an>1), where n=3.  If less than 6 slides are correctly positioned, the individual 
and socially optimal solution is to invest zero in the group account.  
Given that solving the real effort task is costly for participants–they need to concentrate and 
work under time pressure–and that there is no reward associated to performance, leaders would 
have no incentive to position slides correctly.   Hence, an<1 and the optimal private and social 
decision is to contribute zero to the public good in each round.  Optimal contribution decisions 
do not change over treatments. 
2.3 Experimental Procedures 
We implemented a lab experiment with 348 students from different disciplines within the period 
of  November 2010 to October 2011. About half of the participants were male. Recruitment was 
conducted by email through the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments - 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) Participants received a show up fee of 2 EUR plus earnings from all 
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rounds in the experiment. The average earning was 17.86 EUR.  In total, we conducted 29 
sessions. Table 2.3 shows an overview of the treatments, sessions, and number of participants.  
 Table 2.3: Number of Observations by Treatment 
Treatment Sessions Subjects Groups Observations (period<11) % 
Random in-group 8 100 25 1,000 28.74 
Random out-group 8 92 23 920 26.44 
Skilled in-group 7 80 20 800 22.98 
Skilled out-group 6 76 19 760 21.84 
Total 28 348 87 3.480 100.00 
 
To ensure that the tasks were fully understood, we provided examples. Also, in the case of the 
second stage real effort task, we allowed participants a practice round.  Pay-out of the public 
good game was explained by using examples. Additionally, we implemented control questions 
before participants solved their task.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
We start the analysis by comparing group performance in the identity task to see if group 
induction was homogeneous over treatments. Figure 2.1 shows Kernel densities of the number of 
objects found in the identity task.  The distribution of the number of found objects was very 
similar throughout treatments with the exception of the treatment out-group leader. On average, 
participants in this treatment found 3.42 objects, while in other treatments, they found between 
4.91 and 5.16 objects.  We find significant differences in the distribution of objects found in 
treatment skilled out-group compared with other treatments (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p-value 
<0.001).  In the coming analysis, we control for the mean number of objects found.  
 Our second analysis attempts to establish whether leaders are comparable across treatments.  
Figure 2.2 presents the Kernel distributions of slides correctly possitioned in the second task 
(before participants were assigned the role of leaders) by participants selected as leaders.  On 
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average, participants selected as leaders in the out-group treament managed to position more 
slides correctly than in-group leaders. In treatments where leaders where selected randomly, out-
group leaders outperformed in-group leaders possitioning 4.17 slides more during the second 
task (Wilcoxon rank sum test p-value: 0.0057), while in treatments where leaders were selected 
according to skills this value was 2.51 (Wilcoxon rank sum test p-value: 0.0099). This result 
suggest that comparisons by treatment need to be controled for differences in initial ability of the 
leaders.   
Figure 2.1: Kernel Density on Number of  Objects Found in the Identity Task 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of Slides Correctly Positioned by Leader and by Treatment in Second Stage 
     
Panel A                  Panel B 
In the third task, participants selected as leaders worked on a real effort task while participants 
selected as group members had to decide on contributions to the public good game.  Descriptive 
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cooperation.  Given that we observed differences in productivity during the second stage 
(number of slides correctly possitioned by the leader) by treatment, we construct a measure that 
takes this difference into account. Hence, we look at the additional productivity of the leader or 
the number of slides correctly positioned by the leader in each period (once they knew they were 
selected as leaders), minus the number of slides correctly possitioned in the second stage (before 
they knew they would be selected as leaders). Figure 2.3 presents the additional productivity of 
the leaders in each of the treatments.13  Panel A compares additional productivity for randomly 
selected in-group and out-group leaders, while panel B presents the results for leaders that are 
selected according to skills. We find that the change in productivity is significantly higher for in-
group leaders than out-group leaders independent of whether the leader is selected randomly or 
by skills (Wilcoxon rank sum test p-value <0.001).     
 
Figure 2.3: Effect of Identity on Real-Effort Task 
 
Panel A    Panel B 
 
Figure 2.4 presents the level of cooperation by treatment. We find that over all periods, members 
with randomly selected leaders contributed significantly more when the leader shared identity 
with the group members than when led by out-group leaders (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.004).  
                                                 
13 Approaching the effect of identity on additional number of slides correctly positioned might bias the results in the 
case where skilled out-group leaders approach the maximum number of slides that is possible to position within 60 






















































Additional Effort by treatment
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On average, participants invested 1.063  points more when led by a random in-group leader.  
This finding also holds for treatments where the leader is selected according to skills.  In this 
case, we find that in in-group treatment members cooperated on average 1.065 points more 
(Wilcoxon ranksum test p-value:0.01) than in the treatment with out-group leaders.  
Interestingly, we find that the cooperation pattern changes for groups with skilled leaders 
compared with groups with random leaders. While the cooperation pattern among groups with 
random leaders presents the traditional downward slope, groups with skilled leaders sustain 
higher cooperation levels over time. 
 
Figure 2.4: Effect of Leaders Identity on Contribution 
    
Panel A    Panel B 
2.4.2 Regression Analysis 
While the preliminary descriptive analysis hints at significant effects due to identity on leader 
productivity and group member contributions, in this section, we use panel data analysis to check 
the robustness of the results.  Table 2.4 presents the results of the regression analysis.  The first 
four columns present a Random Effect Panel Regression on the number of slides correctly 
positioned (Productivity). Standard errors are clustered by id. Columns 5 to 8 present regression 
results on a Tobit Random Effects Model on number of points invested in the group account 
(Contribution). We use observed information (OIM) standard errors. We present separate models 
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second stage (before leadership assignment), group performance in the identity task (identity 
control) and session specific effects (session dummies).  In addition, columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 add a 
set of controls and interaction terms with the identity variable (out-group).  
Table 2.4:  Regression Results 
  
Number of slides correctly positioned: Random 
Effects panel regression 
 Number of points contributed:  
 Tobit random effects panel regression - marginal effects 
reported (dy/dx) 
  
Random leader Skilful leader  
  
Random leader Skilful leader 
Coeff. Coeff.  dy/dx dy/dx 
        (1)  (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
out-group -9.054** -7.430* -0.456 0.792 out-group -7.810*** -5.468*** -6.100** -4.962** 
(3,975) (4,336) (0.999) (1,333)  (2,409) (1,911) (2,597) (2,243) 
Contribution (t-1)  0.0414  0.00806 Contribution (t-1) 0.114***  0.141*** 
 (0.0275)  (0.0148)   (0.0190)  (0.0207) 
Period  0.303***  0.214* Period  -0.299***  -0.0738 


















(0.273) Marginal Effects by InGroup and OutGroup Leader 
     
Contribution (t-1)  
   
    
InGroup  0.161***  0.148*** 
     
 (0.0289)  (0.0326) 
     
OutGroup  0.067**  0.141*** 
     
 (0.0278)  (0.0314) 
    
Multiplier (t-1)    
     
InGroup  8.002***  7.156*** 
     
 (2.5098)  (2.5896) 
     
OutGroup  4.729*  2917 
    
 (2.8104)  (2.5158) 
 
    
Period    
 
    
InGroup  -0.332***  -0.109 
 
    
 (0.6497)  (0.0678) 
 
    
OutGroup  -0.266***  -0.037 
 
    
 (0.0618)  (0.0737) 
  
    Leaders' Ability YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Identity control YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Session dummies  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
constant 6,285 3,142 -0.162 -2,256  
   
 
  -4,956 -5,386 -4,874 -5,187       
N 480 432 390 351   1440 1296 1170 1053 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We find that leaders discriminate in favor of their own group. Outside leaders perform relatively 
worse than inside leaders.  However, this effect is only significant when leaders are randomly 
selected. For skillful leaders, there are no significant effects of identity on performance in the 
real effort task. This could indicate that skilled participants have an internal motivation to work 
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in the task (i.e. they enjoyed it more than others, or wanted to increase performance) so their 
behavior was not affected by the treatment. Although we expected that leaders productivity 
would depend on group member cooperation—as they would feel that their effort may payoff 
only when participants contribute to the public good — we find no significant effects to member 
contributions.  Not surprisingly, we found that positive learning effects and leader performance 
increased over time.  
Regression results of the Tobit Random Effects Model support the findings of a negative effect 
of out-group leader on cooperation. Cooperation is significantly lower when participants are led 
by an out-group leader compared with an in-group leader independently of whether the leader is 
selected randomly or based on skills.  As expected, contributions increase with contributions of 
other group members. Contribution also increases with the lag value of the multiplier, a.  
Member contributions increase between 0.51 and 0.63 points if the multiplier increases by 0.1 
point.  However, we find a difference in the contribution patterns between random and skilled 
leaders.  While we observe a decreasing level of contributions over periods for random leaders, 
for skillful leaders, contributions do not decrease significantly over time.  This indicates that 
skilled leaders are able to sustain higher cooperation levels.   
We consider the independent marginal effects for treatments with in-group and out-group leaders 
and present the results in Table 2.4.  Interestingly, we find that groups with in-group leaders 
reciprocate cooperation of other group members to a greater extent than groups with an out-
group leader. While in random treatments contributions increase by 0.16 if other contribution 
increases by 1 point in in-group treatments, it increases only 0.07 in treatments with an out-group 
leader.  The lower sensitivity to group member contributions in groups with out-group leader 
could be related with the "treat of identity". In this case, group members might attach a value to 
keep a positive image in front of the external leader so members cooperate despite observing a 
decrease in contributions by other group members.  We also find that group members are more 
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sensitive to the return of the public good (multiplier) when led by an in-group leader compared 
to an out-group leader. This effect, however, is not significant. 
Given that the multiplier is not constant over treatments, differences in contributions could be 
attributed to differences in the return to the public good.  Controlling for the leader’s initial level 
of ability, and the lagged multiplier should be enough to control for these differences. Yet, as an 
additional robustness check, we compare groups with the same multiplier.  We run the same 
regression analysis considering groups which have the same multiplier (0.5) in 8 or more periods 
and in 9 or more periods.  We find that the results are robust although as expected the 
significance is lower.   
Turning back to the question: what is best for cooperation: a skilled out-group leader or a 
random in-group leader?  Are gains in productivity that skilled out-group leaders bring able to 
outweigh the loss in cooperation due to their lack of identification with the group? Figure 2.4 
presents average cooperation levels for the four treatments included in our design.  The green-
line in Panel A refers to contribution levels for a randomly selected in-group leader, while the 
blue line in Panel B refers to contributions for a skillful out-group leader.  Using the Wilcoxon 
rank sum test, we find that the contribution level is not significantly different for random in-
group leaders or skilled out-group leaders (Wilcoxon ranksum test p value 0.1094). To test the 
robustness of  this result, we estimate the models in Table 2.4 taking into account the interaction 
effect of identity and skills. Table 2.5 presents the results of the linear combination of 
coefficients and marginal effects. As expected, we find that the lack of identity decreases leader 
productivity while leader skills increase it.  The net effect of identity and skills imply a slightly 
negative effect on productivity, yet this effect is not significant once we control for contribution 
of group members and period.  Consistent with our previous results, we find that even though 
cooperation decreases for out-side leaders, the positive effect of skilled leaders is just enough to 
compensate for this effect.  Hence, we conclude that having a skillful out-group leader is similar 
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to having a random in-group leader except that skillful leaders are able to sustain higher 
cooperation levels over time.  This effect might be associated with confidence in the leader as 
this effect remains even when we control for the value of the multiplier, and contribution of 
others in the group.   
Table 2.5: Identity vs. Skills – Pooled data 
  Effort: RE panel regession 
Contribution: Tobit random effects panel regression - 
marginal effects reported 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Linear Combination Marginal effects 
Effect of Identity -10.70** -11.12** Effect of Identity -7.406*** -5.231* 
(1) (4.586) (4.908) (1) (2.556) (2.690) 
Effect of Skills for Out-group 3.673 4.483 Effect of Skills for Out-group 5.090 3.746 
2+3 (2.889) (3.130) 2+3 (2.646) (2.717) 
Net Effect Identity and Skills -7.027*** -6.527 Net Effect Identity and Skills -2.312 -1.484 
1+2+3 (4.586) (4.026) 1+2+3 (2.558) (2.690) 
N 870 783 
 
2610 2349 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01" 
   
2.5 Conclusion 
Using an experimental approach, we find evidence that supports the intuition that out-group 
leaders can have a negative impact on organizations.  Our results indicate that when out-group 
leaders are not highly skilled, they are less willing to work for the group than in-group leaders.  
Group members seem to anticipate this and cooperate less with an out-group than with an in-
group leader.  However, the negative effect of identity is compensated by leader skills.  Skilled 
leaders do their best for the organization independently of their identity.  Nonetheless, group 
members fail to recognize this and cooperate less when they have a skilled out-group leader than 
when they have a skilled in-group leader.  Despite being less productive, random in-group 
leaders bring about the same levels of cooperation as skilled out-group leaders.  In other words, 
the gains of higher skills from the out-group leader are just enough to compensate the lack of 
identity. These results indicate that if organizations are to select a leader, it is best to select 
skilled leaders from inside. In many cases, organizations might lack human capacity among their 
members. Hence, training members within the organization to assume leadership roles seems to 
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payoff.  This is, however, a long term task.  Therefore, having an skilled outside leader could be 
an alternative.  
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Abstract 
Elite Capture characterizes leaders’ power abuse through the privation and/or embezzlement 
of common resources. In development literature, Elite Capture is fairly often reported while 
partly even accepted in many small communities which can potentially cause  a perpetuation 
mechanism. This paper analyzes how group identity can perpetuate abuse of power by 
leaders. Particularly, we test the hypothesis that scrutiny is lower among in-group leaders 
compared to an out-group leader which leads to an increase in power abuse. Our results 
confirm that members in homogenous identity groups are less willing to pay for monitoring, 
and that this lack of scrutiny increases leaders’ embezzlement. 
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Leaders play important roles in their organizations. Yet, by being empowered to lead, leaders 
might abuse their power and self-reward themselves. Embezzlement or elite capture is fairly 
common and accepted phenomena in local communities in developing countries. Communities 
seem to accept it as a form of reward for the local leader.  The objective of this paper is to 
investigate the causes of power abuse. Particularly, we consider whether social identity, defined 
as a sense of identification to a group to which individuals consign emotional attachment, causes 
and perpetuates power abuse. We consider whether in-group leaders benefit from higher trust 
and lower monitoring, which enables them to abuse their power more than out-group leaders.     
Elite capture describes a situation where local elites deny access to common resources to part of 
the group members or capture these resources for themselves (Dutta, 2009; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2005). It becomes an important phenomenon in the context of development as 
inefficiencies in the local development projects are often related to it (Platteau and Abraham, 
2002). For instance, Powis (2007) report evidence of such elite capture in rural India, Darmawan 
(2012) in Indonesia, and Wong (2010) in Bangladesh and Ghana. Borras et al. (2007) find 
evidence that a marked-led agrarian reform in the Philippines benefited only the elite. Thorp et 
al. (2005) describe the exclusion of poorer members among different types of group 
communities such as credit groups, women’s groups, scavenger groups and producer 
associations. A particularly interesting example of elite capture is given in a west-African 
country (not cited by the authors) by Platteau and Gaspart (2003); the authors describe a system 
of capture strongly affixed in the political norm characterized by resource appropriation, 
financial malpractices such as falsifying of accounts, invoice over-reporting and under-
performance of contractors due to low-quality materials. Even after a process of strengthening 
the associations’ institution, the local political norm of capture became so solid, that even 
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democratic elections would not change the system where elite capture was predominant and 
known in the community.   
A set of papers relates the causes of power abuse to lack of suitable monitoring. Using a 
randomized field experiment, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) find that informing schools and 
parents in local Ugandan communities about a large school grant program through newspaper 
campaigns increased monitoring and reduced capture. Olken (2005) find a decrease of capture in 
response to top-down monitoring, while Björkman and Svensson (2007) find an improvement in 
the quality and quantity of health service provisions in response to bottom-up monitoring.  
Further papers relate the cause of capture to community characteristics. Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2005) for example argue that the typical poor governance structure of the projects where power 
and money are distributed at the local level facilitates collusion and, hence, makes these more 
susceptible to elite capture. Relating capture to community composition, Mansuri and Rao 
(2003) argue towards community heterogeneity as a cause of capture; with higher income 
inequality projects perform worse. Similarly, Iversen et al. (2006) discovered that a highly 
ethnically diverse forestry community in Terai, Nepal was highly susceptible to elite capture. In 
Burkina Faso, Bernard et al. (2008) find an association between ethnic heterogeneity and 
beneficiary exclusion of poor villagers. Further evidence was provided by Alesina et al. (1999), 
who find lower shares spent on the public good in ethnically more fragmented regions in the US.  
Experimental evidence of elite capture is provided by van der Heijden et al. (2009), who test a 
hierarchical against a non-hierarchical firm structure, and find a positive effect of leaders once 
they are positioned to distribute  groups’ endowments. The authors compare two different 
institutional settings which are vulnerable to opportunistic behavior in a Public Good Game 
(PGG): (1) equally shared revenues without a leader and (2) reallocation of revenues determined 
by the leader. They find that leaders do not appropriate revenues. Instead, they are efficient in 
disciplining group members by withholding money for shirkers and rewarding cooperators. 
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A different twist of this result provide de Cremer and van Dijk (2005). The authors find that the 
entitlement feeling increased leaders’ retained amount. Interestingly, Galinsky et al. (2003) find 
a paradox on leaders’ taking and contributing behavior. Leaders are more prone to take from a 
common pool, while controversially present higher contribution to the public good. The authors 
relate these findings to leaders’ entitlement, arguing that the power related to this position creates 
a tendency towards taking an action, regardless of its neutral, pro-social or antisocial outcome. 
In a paper more directed to the elite capture concept, D’Exelle and Riedl (2008) study two 
dimensions of power abuse: elite capture, measured by resource distribution, and social 
exclusion, measured by voting against group members. The results show that leaders tend to 
search for the approval of the majority leading to a collusion mechanism; this collusion 
mechanism would enhance exclusion of the poor in case they voted against the current leader. In 
this setting, punishment mechanism would not work as a channel to overcome power abuse, but 
it would turn against the poor, as instead of a reduction in leaders’ share, it induces a revenge 
mechanism and ends in exclusion. Alternatively, they find that poor leaders take a more equity 
inclined distribution strategy. 
While there are some papers analyzing leaders’ allocation preferences, only a few relate it to 
group identity. Among those few, Smith (2012) finds that in-group members privilege other in-
group members against out-group members, even when bearing efficiency losses. Yet, groups 
with leaders were found less likely to harm outsiders (Ellman and Pezanis-Christou, 2007).  
This paper contributes to the literature on elite capture by providing experimental evidence on 
one of the mechanisms that might perpetuate power abuse. Particularly, we consider shared 
social identity to be a cause of lack of scrutiny over the in-group leader.  The lack of scrutiny is 
reflected in lower willingness of group members to monitor, which results in higher levels of 
power abuse. Our results point towards a higher willingness to pay for monitoring when the 
leader is an outsider. Yet, in the absence of monitoring, contributions decrease and proportional 
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outtake is higher. Moreover, we find that scrutiny is more effective when the leader is an 
outsider.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses the experimental design and 
hypothesis.  Section 3.4 describes the data and presents the results.  The last section concludes 
with some discussion. 
3.2 Experimental Design 
We divided the experiment in four stages: group identity induction, leadership selection, a trust 
game and a lottery game. The first stage induced identities using a procedure similar to the group 
identity task described in Section 2.2. In the first stage participants solved a common task while 
communicating and competing with other group members.  Participants were randomly divided 
in groups of three and each group was assigned a blue or a green color. We asked participants to 
find the highest number of differences on two similar pictures. During the task, participants had 
the chance to communicate with the other group members through a chat-box. The solution of 
the task was typed in individually but was considered valid only if all the members typed in the 
same solution. The task was designed as a tournament, so that green groups were competing 
against blue groups. To avoid income effects, participants did not receive monetary incentives to 
solve this task. Instead, at the end of the experiment winning groups received a congratulation 
message.  
The second stage was used to introduce a hierarchical structure or an elite in the group. Elites 
can take many forms related to social divisions such as class, casts, wealth, religious affiliations, 
lineage, etc. where an essential characteristic of the elites is privileged access to power. 
Accordingly, we defined our elite as a leader with additional – exogenous – access to power. We 




The third stage consisted in a real effort task followed by a modified trust game. To avoid house 
money effects15 participants solved a real effort task in which they earn their endowment. The 
real effort task was to sum 5 two digit numbers. Participants had 30 seconds to solve as many 
summations as possible. To avoid income heterogeneity, all participants received 20 points as 
endowment regardless of their performance in the task. Once group members have earned their 
endowment, they participated in a trust game with two trustors and one trustee. The trustee was 
the selected leader, while the trustors were the other two participants in the group. Trustors had 
to decide how many points they wanted to pass to the trustee leader and how many points they 
wanted to keep to themselves. At this stage, leaders’ where asked about amount of passed points 
they expect the members to pass to them, while members where asked about the amount of 
points they expect the leader to take. Corrected answers were rewarded by 4 points, answers 
differing by 1 point were rewarded by 3 points and 2 were rewarded by 1 point. The amount kept 
to themselves was multiplied by one while the amount passed was multiplied by the factor A. 
Hence, points passed by participant i, pi, generated a value of Api. The task for the trustee leaders 
was to decide how much of the value generated he wanted to return to the trustors. This decision 
was made independently for each of the group members. The value of the factor A depended on 
the performance of the trustee leader in the real effort task. If the trustee leader solved less than 
one sum correctly, A took the value 0.8. Otherwise the multiplier was randomly assigned and 
took a value between 0.8 and 1.9. By making the factor A dependent on leaders’ performance in 
the real effort task, we intended to generate the feeling of entitlement. Yet, the randomness of the 
multiplier does not allow members to infer either leaders’ effort, or the amount of captured 
points.  
                                                 
15 The house money effect  (Thaler and Johnson 1990) characterizes a risk seeking behavior when precedent from a  
winning situation (called by gamblers house money), in contrast to earned money.  
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In order to insure comparability between groups and sessions, the factor A was predetermined 
and fixed over periods once that the leader solved at least one sum correctly. Table 3.1 presents 
the factor used over periods. 
Table 3.1: Value of the Factor A Used over Periods 
 Period 
 One Two Three Four Five Six Seven 
A 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.5 
Note: this value was used conditional on the leader being able to solve at least one sum correctly 
We use a 2x2 between subject design. Participants were matched either with an in-group or an 
out-group leader. In-group leaders corresponded to groups with homogeneous identities where 
the leader and group members played in the same group in the identity induction task. 
Consequently, in out-group treatments, blue leaders were assigned to play with green groups and 
vice-versa. Moreover we implemented the monitoring mechanism dependent on the treatment. In 
treatments with monitoring, we implemented costly monitoring. Group members were able to 
pay two points to observe the amount of points that the leader took from the respective member. 
Participants did not receive payments from the investments of other group participants. After the 
members’ took the monitoring decision in each period, leaders were informed if they were being 
observed by at least one member, but this did not have monetary consequences for the leader.  
By informing whether monitoring was taking place or not, but not on how many members were 
monitoring, we could decrease the dimension of observability from three (not observed, 
observed by one member, observed by two members) to two (observed or not observed).  The 
modified trust game was played for seven periods. Table 3.2 presents the treatments.  
Table 3.2: Treatments 
 No monitoring  Monitoring  
In-group Treat 1 Treat 3 
Out-group Treat 2 Treat 4 
 
Individual payoff functions for group members and leaders are: 
Group Members' payoff:  𝛱𝑀𝑖 = (𝑒 − 𝑝𝑖) + 𝐴𝑝𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖 
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Leaders payoff: 𝛱𝐿 = 𝑒 + 𝑇1 + 𝑇2, 
where e stands for endowment, pi denotes the amount of points that group member i passed to 
the leader, A  the random multiplier between 0.8 and 1.9, Ti the amount of points that the leader 
embezzle from group member i, and Mi group member i's monitoring costs.  
On the last stage of the experiment, participants played a lottery game that follows Holt and 
Laury (2002) design. The results are primarily used to control for risk aversion. To ensure that 
risk aversion was not affected by the treatments and as such fulfills the control purposes, we 
tested for statistical significance among treatments finding no evidence supporting any affect of 
treatment induction on risk aversion.  
3.3 Hypothesis and Predictions 
From Group Identity Theory (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) we adopt the premise that identity 
enhances expectations regarding individuals’ behavior within the same group, driving 
individuals actions according to their social identity. We predict that the adapted behavior which 
is align to groups expectation would also positively affect trust levels within the group. Follows 
the predictions:  
Hypothesis 1: group identity enhances trust in the leader, increasing passed points and decreasing 
willingness to pay towards monitoring the leader. 
Hypothesis 2: the lack of monitoring from members and the consequent unobservability and 
privacy increases capture from leaders who share the same identity with members.  
3.4 Data and Results 
We conducted lab experiments with 234 students from different areas of study at Georg-August 
University of Göttingen (Germany) between June and October 2012. Subjects’ recruitment was 
done through the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiment ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
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Average earning per student and experiment was 16.91 EUR. Table 3.3 shows the number of 
observations by treatment.  
Table 3.3: Observations by Treatment 
Treatment Sessions Subjects Groups Observations % 
In-group no monitoring 3 60 20 420 25.64 
Out-group no monitoring 3 60 20 420 25.64 
In-group with monitoring 3 54 18 378 23.08 
Out-group with monitoring 3 60 20 420 25.64 
Total 12 234 78 1638 100 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
a) Trust 
Figure 3.1 shows the mean of points passed from members to the leader by leader type without 
monitoring possibility (panel A) and with (panel B) the monitoring mechanism. 25% of members 
in in-group treatment paid to observe leaders action (Treatment 3), while 27.5% of members 
with out-group leaders decided to monitor (Treatment 4).  
Figure 3.1: Amount of Points Passed by In and Out-Group Leaders with and without Monitoring 
   
Panel A      Panel B  
  
Panel A indicates more trust in leaders who share group members’ identity. We observe that 
members led by in-group leaders passed on average 1.30 more points to the leader than those led 
by out-group leaders (Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.011). However, this effect 
vanishes when members are able to monitor leaders’ embezzlement behavior (panel B). Using 
Average difference:  1.307 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test – p-value: 0.011 
 
Average difference: 0.203 




the Wilcoxon Rank sum test, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal distribution in the number 
of points passed at any reasonable level of significance (p-value 0.64). Interestingly, we find that 
members led by in-group leaders do not significantly increase the amount of points passed when 
given the possibility to monitor the leader (comparison between blue lines in panels A and B; 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.25). In contrast, members led by out-group leaders 
strongly react to this option. The number of points passed increased by 1.76 points under 
monitoring as compared with no monitoring for participants with an out-group leader 
(comparison between red lines in panels A and B; Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.00). 
This indicates that monitoring is important to overcome the mistrust in the out-group leader, 
while it does not enhance trust in in-group treatment. We suspect that a shared identity between 
group members and leaders is associated with a level of trust high enough to make monitoring 
redundant.  
b) Effort 
Figure 3.2 presents the results of the real effort task - mean of solved sums in stage three of the 
experiment - by treatments. Panel A shows that, without the monitoring mechanism, in-group 
leaders were able to solve 0.3 more sums then out-group leaders on average (Mean-comparison 
test with p-value 0.0372).This difference in effort is not present under monitoring possibility (see 
panel B; Mean-comparison test with p-value 0.2793). Similarly, means of correctly calculated 
sums for in-group leaders with and without monitoring do not differ significantly (comparison 
between blue lines, panel A and B; Mean-comparison test with p-value 0.3719). However, we 
find a higher performance in the real effort task when out-group leaders' work under the 
monitoring mechanism (comparison between red lines, panel A and B; Mean-comparison test 
with p-value 0.0014). These strengthen the belief that monitoring is an effective tool to 
incentivize out-group leaders to work harder, while it has no effect on in-group leaders. Still, by 
comparing the effort levels of in-group leaders without monitoring (panel A; blue line) with out-
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group leaders with monitoring (panel B; red line), we find that despite their positive reaction to 
monitoring, out-group leaders are not able to outperform in-group leaders in terms of effort 
(Mean-comparison test with p-value 0.1675).  
Figure 3.2: Effort by Leaders’ Identity with and without Monitoring 
    
Panel A      Panel B 
   
c) Monitoring decision 
Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of participants who monitored the leader by leaders’ identity and 
per period. When comparing groups led by in-group leaders and groups led by out-group leaders, 
we see that the percentage of members who decided to monitor per period is similar from periods 
one to three (Two-group test of proportions with p-value 0.6613). There is, however, a shift in 
tendency after period three. Starting from period four, the proportion of members who paid to 
monitor was 6.3% higher when led by out-group leaders (Two-group test of proportions with p-
value 0.0898). This tendency is similar at group level (Panel B measured by proportion of groups 
where at least one group member decided to monitor the leader). Between periods one and three 
the differences is not statistically different (Two-group test of proportions with p-value 0.887), 
but they turn 11.4% higher for out-group leaders after period three (Two-group test of 
proportions with p-value 0.0223). 
 
 
Average difference:  0.3 
Mean comparison test – p-value: 0.0372 
 
Average difference:  0.102381 




Figure 3.3: Proportion of Participants who Paid to Monitor the Leader by Leaders’ Identity 
  
   Panel A     Panel B 
d) Elite Capture 
In order to identify how the monitoring mechanism can affect elite capture, we explicit three 
possible cases that can occur: (1) monitoring is not possible (and does not occur) (2) monitoring 
is possible, but by members’ choice does not occur and (3) monitoring is possible and by 
members’ choice occurs. The leader is informed if at least one group member is monitoring him.  
Figure 3.4: Proportional Outtake by Leaders’ Identity with and without Monitoring  
 
Panel A      Panel B 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the proportion of points taken out of the value generated (points each member 
passed multiplied by A) in treatments where monitoring is not possible and where monitoring is 
possible (independently if it occurs or not). Although out-group leaders tend to take a higher 
Average difference: -.0436423 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test – p-value:  0.6489 
Average difference: .0627037 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test – p-value:  0.0103 
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proportion of the value generated than in-group leaders without a monitoring mechanism, this 
difference is not significant (Figure 3.3 Panel A; Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.65). 
With the possibility to monitor, this pattern changes and in-group leaders keep on average six 
percentage points more to themselves than out-group leaders (Figure 3.3 Panel B; Wilcoxon 
Rank sum test with p-value 0.0103). 
Figure 3.5 presents the average fraction of points taken in each period by leaders’ identity when 
the leader was actually being observed and actually not being observed. Panel A presents the 
comparison between in-group and out-group leaders when the leader is as a matter of fact 
observed by at least one group member. It is possible to see that once leaders are actually 
observed, their capture behavior does not differ between in-group and out-group leaders. Panel B 
shows the mean of proportional outtake for each period by treatment when the leader knew that 
no member actually observed the embezzled amount (despite having the opportunity). Here, a 
change in behavior between different types of leaders becomes evident; in-group leaders take on 
average 12% more points than out-group leaders when they are certain that nobody observes 
them (Panel B; Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.0002).  
Figure 3.5: Proportional Outtake by Identity and Actual Monitoring 
Panel A     Panel B 
 While in-group leaders take a higher proportion of the value generated when group members 
decide not to monitor compared to groups that monitor (comparison between blue lines in panels 
Average difference: 0.001 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test  – p-value:  0.753 
Average difference:  0.123 
Wilcoxon Rank sum test  – p-value:  0.0002 
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A and B; Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-value 0.035), this behavior does not occur among out-
group leaders (comparison between red lines in panels A and B; Wilcoxon Rank sum test with p-
value 0.508).  
This result provides first evidence that sharing the same identity can in fact be detrimental to 
groups as it instigates power abuse of the leader; when not observed, in-group leaders keep a 
significantly higher amount of points, while out-group leaders do not increase embezzlement 
when not observed.  
3.4.2  Regression Analysis 
This section provides causal inferences about the relationship between identity, trust, monitoring 
and capture. Table 3.4 presents a tobit random effect panel regression on trust  measured by 
passed points (columns one and two), a probit random effect panel regression on probability to 
monitor (column three), and a fractional logit (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) for elite capture 
measured by the proportional capture (columns four and five) with robust standard errors. Trust 
is measured by the amount of points passed to the leader from 0 to 20. Monitoring is measured 
by a dummy variable taking the value one if a member opted to monitor the leader. Elite capture 
is the share of points taken by the leader with regard to the amount of points passed after being 
multiplied by A, varying from 0.00 to 1.00. Columns one and four present results without the 
monitoring possibility (Treatment 1 and 2), while columns two, three and five present results 
with the monitoring possibility (Treatment 3 and 4). 
 Column one and two show the amount of points passed by the members to the leader, while not 
having the possibility to monitor (column one) and having the possibility to monitor (column 
two). The regression considers the following variables: out-group for groups led by out-group 
leaders and Effort, a dummy taking the value one if the leader reached the minimal effort. To 
capture identity specific effects, we include two interaction terms with the variable out-group, 
out*no monitoring for deciding against observing the leader, and out*lagged return, for the 
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amount of points returned to the member in previous period. Lastly we include a risk aversion 
indicator following Holt and Laury (2002) taking the values 0 to 10 increasing the more risk-
averse, session dummies and a continuous period variable. Variables on monitoring were not 
present in treatment 1 and 2 (column two). 
Table 3.4: Regression Analysis on Trust, Monitoring and Elite Capture – Marginal Effects Reported 
    
RE Tobit – Trust  RE Probit  
Monitor 
Fractional logit – Elite 
Capture 
    
Treat 1 and 2 Treat 3 and 4 Treat 3 and 4 Treat 1 and 2 Treat 3 and 4 
 no monitoring monitoring monitoring no monitoring monitoring 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
out-group  -0.510 -0.575 0.873** 0.180*** -0.115*** 
  (-0.65) (-0.78) (2.02) (4.98) (-2.85) 
Effort  
   
-0.0129* -0.0126 
 
   
(-1.68) (-1.24) 





0.070***   
 
  
(2.31)   
 Out-group=1 
  
0.0402*   
  
  
(1.8)   
out*E(capture) Out-group=0   0.005   
    (0.08)   
 Out-group=1   0.080*   
    (1.76)   
out*no monitoring Out-group=0  -0.351   0.140*** 
   (-0.45)   (2.73) 
 Out-group=1  -1.403***   -0.014 
   (-2.05)   (-0.38) 
out* lagged return Out-group=0 0.556*** 0.544***    
  (10.17) (8.1)    
 Out-group=1 0.621*** 0.615***    
  (11.80) (12.31)    
out*E(passed points)- 
passed points 
Out-group=0    -0.009*** 0.000 
    (-4.62) (0.11) 
Out-group=1    -0.015*** -0.007*** 
     (-4.95) (-2.8) 
out*total votes 
accumulated 
Out-group=0     0.033 
     (1.67) 
 Out-group=1     0.001 
      (0.04) 
risk aversion  -0.182** -0.111 -0.0234 -0.00280 -0.0151*** 
  (-2.17) (-1.28) (-0.48) (-0.65) (-3.18) 
Period  -0.0169 -0.290*** -0.111** -0.0162*** -0.0222** 
  (-0.18) (-2.82) (-2.32) (-2.79) (-2.39) 
Session dummies  YES YES YES YES YES 
N   480 438 438 560 511 
t and z statistics in parentheses 




In contrast to previous descriptive findings in Figure 3.1,the regression results on trust show that 
having an outsider as a leader does not interfere with the amount of passed points to the leader as 
out-group turns insignificant (columns one and two). As expected, the amount of points returned 
by the leader in previous period is positively correlated with the amount of points passed for 
members with in-/ and out-group leaders. Additionally, we find that the lack of actual monitoring 
significantly decreases passed points to out-group leaders (column two). When members did not 
observe out-group leaders take up, members decreased passed points by 1.403, while we did not 
find any evidence of a significant response to monitoring decision from members led by in-group 
leaders. This result points towards a higher effectiveness of monitoring on trust among groups 
with outsiders as leader. 
Additionally, we find a decrease in passed points by 0.182 in response to an increase in risk 
aversion, which disappears once the monitoring mechanism is put into place. This result points 
to the fact that monitoring successfully crowds out risk aversion.  
Column three presents results on determinants of the decision to monitor the leader. We find that 
members led by out-group leaders are 87.3% more prone to opt towards observing leaders’ take-
up. As expected, when passed points were higher, members used monitoring as a tool to mitigate 
possible future losses. Our results show that the higher the amount of passed points in the 
previous period, the higher the probability to monitor leaders’ actions. In addition, higher 
expected capture (E(capture)) among members led by out-group leaders implies higher 
willingness to pay for monitoring; if the expected capture increases by one point, probability to 
monitor the out-side leader increases by 8%. This effect turns insignificant for members in in-
group leader treatments. This is first evidence towards higher suspicion of group members when 
led by out-group leaders. These are, consequently, more willing to pay for monitoring. 
Columns four and five present the results of a fractional logit model on leaders’ proportional 
embezzlement, or elite capture. Complementarily to the described variables above, we 
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considered the following determinants of elite capture: no monitoring, when leaders were not 
observed by at least one group member, leaders’ effort measured by solved sums (Effort), and 
E(passed points) – passed points, which is the difference between points leaders expected 
members to pass and the actual amount of points passed. Furthermore, we control for a possible 
revenge mechanism from the leader as a response to members’ monitoring decisions. We include 
a numeric variable indicating the amount of times that the leader was observed by at least one 
member in the given period (total votes accumulated). In addition, we include two interaction 
terms out* {E(passed points) – passed point}s and out*total votes accumulated. The remaining 
variables are the same.  
When monitoring was not possible, out-group leaders captured about 18% more than in-group 
leaders (column four). Additionally, we find that higher effort is associated with less take-up by 
leaders, which indicates that committed leaders are less susceptible to power abuse. 
Column five shows the same regressions with the possibility to observe the leader. We find that 
embezzlement behavior of in-/ and out-group leaders changes once group members have the 
possibility to monitor; while out-group leaders captured 18% in treatments without monitoring 
possibility, total effect on embezzlement from outside leaders becomes 11.5% lower under 
monitoring possibility. This finding indicates that out-group leaders respond to the monitoring 
mechanism while for homogenous identity groups it might damage leaders’ good behavior. 
Besides, we find that effort becomes insignificant given the option to monitor which indicates 
that monitoring possibility potentially reduces the effort by committed leaders.  
Marginal effects of the interaction terms confirm the descriptive analysis related to Figure 3.5. 
In-group leaders embezzle on average 14% more conditional on being actually observed than 
otherwise, which indicates that the lack of observability increases their capture. Together with 
the higher capture of in-group leaders once members are given the possibility to observe, this 
finding indicates that the possibility to observe might harm the group’s social identity. The 
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monitoring mechanism might trigger feelings of mistrust and disappointment by the in-group 
leaders, which could potentially explain higher embezzlement given a possibility to monitor. 
However, we do not find any evidence of revenge behavior by leaders, as total votes 
accumulated turn out insignificant. 
Overall, our results indicate that members led by out-group leaders are 87.3% more willing to 
pay for monitoring (column three); while actual observability increases their trust by 1.4 points 
(column two). We find that out-group leaders embezzle more (column four), but once they are 
potentially monitored, they capture 11.5% less then in-group leaders (column five). Furthermore, 
when knowing that they are not observed, in-group leaders abuse their power by capturing 14% 
more than out-group leaders (column five). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Our paper discusses the role of identity in a perpetuation mechanism of power abuse by group 
leaders. In the reported results we find evidence that group members are less willing to pay 
towards monitoring a leader whose identity they share; furthermore, not only is monitoring less 
present among groups with homogeneous identities, it also does not have an impact on in-group 
members’ trust. When analyzing embezzlement behavior without the possibility to monitor we 
find that out-group leaders have a higher appropriation rate; however, this pattern changes with 
the offer to monitor. We then observe an increase in embezzlement by in-group leaders. 
Furthermore, the absence of actual monitoring boosts capture among in-group leaders while out-
group leaders react to monitoring possibility with lower embezzlement. These findings lead us to 
the conclusion that monitoring is an effective tool for groups with heterogeneous identities, 
while it damages social capital among homogeneous identity groups, turning leaders 
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Appendix 1.1 - Region of Common Support 
Panel A 
 
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations  
 
Panel B 
Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations  
 
 

























Heterogeneous shocks by region















Source: PNAD 2006, own calculations   
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Appendix 1.1 - Balancing test – Complete Sample 
    Mean    t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias % reduct|bias| t p>|t| 
asset_index Unmatched -1.1329 0.11148 -92.1   -128.86 0.000 
  Matched -1.1338 -1.2199 6.4 93.1 7.24 0.000 
indian Unmatched 0.00296 0.00287 0.2   0.23 0.821 
  Matched 0.0029 0.00384 -1.7 -980.6 -1.97 0.048 
black Unmatched 0.07106 0.06082 4.1   5.88 0.000 
  Matched 0.07116 0.0734 -0.9 78.2 -1.06 0.291 
asian Unmatched 0.0015 0.00373 -4.4   -5.79 0.000 
  Matched 0.0015 0.00234 -1.6 62.7 -2.33 0.020 
parda Unmatched 0.64173 0.4613 36.9   51.62 0.000 
  Matched 0.64169 0.64746 -1.2 96.8 -1.48 0.140 
age Unmatched 11.327 11.598 -8.0   -11.16 0.000 
  Matched 11.325 11.257 2.0 74.7 2.48 0.013 
birth_registered Unmatched 0.9989 0.99797 2.4   3.18 0.001 
  Matched 0.99893 0.99743 3.8 -61.0 4.31 0.000 
UF1 Unmatched 0.0151 0.01999 -3.7   -5.14 0.000 
  Matched 0.01515 0.01745 -1.8 53.0 -2.23 0.026 
UF2 Unmatched 0.01925 0.01265 5.3   7.68 0.000 
  Matched 0.01912 0.02562 -5.2 1.6 -5.39 0.000 
UF3 Unmatched 0.02644 0.02458 1.2   1.66 0.096 
  Matched 0.02626 0.03306 -4.3 -267.6 -4.91 0.000 
UF4 Unmatched 0.00895 0.00542 4.2   6.12 0.000 
  Matched 0.00897 0.00801 1.1 72.6 1.29 0.197 
UF5 Unmatched 0.0675 0.06371 1.5   2.17 0.030 
  Matched 0.06739 0.08004 -5.1 -233.0 -5.93 0.000 
UF6 Unmatched 0.00316 0.01598 -13.2   -16.88 0.000 
  Matched 0.00317 0.0036 -0.4 96.6 -0.91 0.361 
UF7 Unmatched 0.01962 0.01471 3.8   5.45 0.000 
  Matched 0.01968 0.02108 -1.1 71.5 -1.21 0.225 
UF8 Unmatched 0.03977 0.01387 16.1   24.57 0.000 
  Matched 0.03973 0.04284 -1.9 88.0 -1.91 0.056 
UF9 Unmatched 0.02996 0.00963 14.6   22.48 0.000 
  Matched 0.02996 0.02919 0.6 96.2 0.55 0.579 
UF10 Unmatched 0.10761 0.04563 23.5   35.2 0.000 
  Matched 0.10746 0.10042 2.7 88.6 2.82 0.005 
UF11 Unmatched 0.02454 0.01277 8.7   12.92 0.000 
  Matched 0.02462 0.02332 1.0 89.0 1.04 0.298 
UF12 Unmatched 0.03708 0.01184 16.4   25.20 0.000 
  Matched 0.03713 0.02889 5.4 67.4 5.65 0.000 
UF13 Unmatched 0.09098 0.05235 15.0   22.04 0.000 
  Matched 0.09105 0.09038 0.3 98.3 0.28 0.776 
UF14 Unmatched 0.03182 0.01246 13.2   19.99 0.000 
  Matched 0.03189 0.02903 2.0 85.2 2.04 0.041 
UF15 Unmatched 0.01869 0.01306 4.5   6.53 0.000 
  Matched 0.01858 0.01732 1.0 77.5 1.17 0.242 
UF16 Unmatched 0.13621 0.07446 20.2   29.72 0.000 
  Matched 0.13655 0.12734 3.0 85.1 3.33 0.001 
UF17 Unmatched 0.09517 0.08659 3.0   4.23 0.000 
  Matched 0.09528 0.08994 1.9 37.8 2.25 0.024 
UF18 Unmatched 0.01816 0.01846 -0.2   -0.32 0.750 
  Matched 0.01812 0.01695 0.9 -284.4 1.09 0.276 
UF19 Unmatched 0.02215 0.06961 -22.8   -29.86 0.000 
  Matched 0.02222 0.02072 0.7 96.8 1.27 0.205 
UF21 Unmatched 0.02903 0.05609 -13.4   -18.06 0.000 
  Matched 0.02882 0.02809 0.4 97.3 0.54 0.589 
UF22 Unmatched 0.00868 0.03212 -16.6   -21.56 0.000 
  Matched 0.00871 0.00724 1.0 93.7 2.02 0.043 
UF23 Unmatched 0.0414 0.07642 -14.9   -20.12 0.000 
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  Matched 0.0413 0.03913 0.9 93.8 1.35 0.177 
UF24 Unmatched 0.01081 0.02336 -9.7   -12.93 0.000 
  Matched 0.01084 0.01448 -2.8 71.0 -3.98 0.000 
UF25 Unmatched 0.01696 0.02627 -6.4   -8.73 0.000 
  Matched 0.01701 0.01932 -1.6 75.3 -2.11 0.035 
UF26 Unmatched 0.0257 0.04657 -11.2   -15.11 0.000 
  Matched 0.02569 0.02923 -1.9 83.1 -2.65 0.008 
UF27 Unmatched 0.01031 0.03578 -17.0   -22.15 0.000 
  Matched 0.01028 0.01171 -1.0 94.4 -1.68 0.092 
rural1 Unmatched 0.00486 0.00554 -1.0   -1.33 0.185 
  Matched 0.00487 0.00597 -1.5 -60.8 -1.84 0.066 
rural2 Unmatched 0.04037 0.01387 16.4   25.03 0.000 
  Matched 0.0401 0.0375 1.6 90.2 1.65 0.099 
rural3 Unmatched 0.00037 0.00081 -1.8   -2.43 0.015 
  Matched 0.00037 0.00047 -0.4 77.4 -0.6 0.548 
rural4 Unmatched 0.00113 0.00041 2.6   3.94 0.000 
  Matched 0.00113 0.0008 1.2 53.5 1.31 0.189 
rural5 Unmatched 0.25981 0.10782 40.0   59.58 0.000 
  Matched 0.26046 0.25102 2.5 93.8 2.65 0.008 
urban2 Unmatched 0.01064 0.00994 0.7   0.98 0.328 
  Matched 0.01054 0.00897 1.6 -125.0 1.95 0.051 
urban3 Unmatched 0.00492 0.00458 0.5   0.71 0.477 
  Matched 0.00487 0.00417 1.0 -103.0 1.28 0.201 
favela Unmatched 0.05191 0.04736 2.1   2.97 0.003 
  Matched 0.05191 0.05648 -2.1 -0.6 -2.47 0.013 
aldeia Unmatched 0.00096 0.00019 3.2   5.13 0.000 
  Matched 0.00097 0.0005 1.9 39.7 2.11 0.035 
head_age Unmatched 42.965 43.423 -4.0   -5.55 0.000 
  Matched 42.987 42.741 2.1 46.4 2.63 0.008 
head_age2 Unmatched 1974 2023.7 -4.4   -6.15 0.000 
  Matched 1975.3 1959.7 1.4 68.7 1.72 0.086 
IT_headage_Z Unmatched 0.44849 0.44805 0.0   0.01 0.989 
  Matched 0.44725 0.58511 -3.2 -31324.7 -3.66 0.000 
head_lite Unmatched 0.70195 0.894 -49.3  -73.92 0.000 
  Matched 0.70121 0.71118 -2.6 94.8 -2.68 0.007 
head_educ Unmatched 4.6334 7.8692 -82.4  -111.53 0.000 
  Matched 4.6229 4.5803 1.1 98.7 1.58 0.115 
head_educ2 Unmatched 32.979 81.28 -80.8  -105.47 0.000 
  Matched 32.842 31.42 2.4 97.1 4.31 0.000 
head_work_~ Unmatched 0.32918 0.11677 52.8  79.00 0.000 
  Matched 0.32972 0.3029 6.7 87.4 7.06 0.000 
head~d_other Unmatched 0.00685 0.01178 -5.1  -6.95 0.000 
  Matched 0.00687 0.00674 0.1 97.3 0.20 0.842 
head_work_~f Unmatched 0.09018 0.12564 -11.4  -15.76 0.000 
  Matched 0.09014 0.09231 -0.7 93.9 -0.92 0.357 
head_work_~n Unmatched 0.10841 0.08704 7.2  10.30 0.000 
  Matched 0.10819 0.11453 -2.1 70.3 -2.47 0.014 
head_wor~rce Unmatched 0.09886 0.15635 -17.3  -23.63 0.000 
  Matched 0.09859 0.10512 -2.0 88.6 -2.65 0.008 
head_work~od Unmatched 0.02753 0.03271 -3.0  -4.20 0.000 
  Matched 0.02749 0.02696 0.3 89.7 0.40 0.688 
head_work_~t Unmatched 0.03059 0.06266 -15.3  -20.43 0.000 
  Matched 0.03056 0.02859 0.9 93.9 1.42 0.155 
head_wor~lic Unmatched 0.02451 0.06374 -19.2  -25.35 0.000 
  Matched 0.02459 0.02179 1.4 92.9 2.28 0.023 
h_service Unmatched 0.02208 0.05457 -17.0  -22.49 0.000 
  Matched 0.02165 0.02139 0.1 99.2 0.23 0.822 
head_wor~tic Unmatched 0.07356 0.05211 8.8  12.78 0.000 
  Matched 0.0733 0.08721 -5.7 35.1 -6.27 0.000 
he~r_service Unmatched 0.02437 0.03224 -4.7  -6.54 0.000 
  Matched 0.02422 0.02419 0.0 99.6 0.03 0.979 
head~k_other Unmatched 0.02853 0.06624 -17.8  -23.69 0.000 
  Matched 0.02826 0.02659 0.8 95.6 1.25 0.211 
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head_work~ed Unmatched 0.00545 0.00249 4.7  7.05 0.000 
  Matched 0.00547 0.00581 -0.5 88.7 -0.55 0.585 
mother_alive Unmatched 0.985 0.97997 3.8  5.28 0.000 
  Matched 0.98499 0.98345 1.2 69.5 1.51 0.132 
mother_liveHH Unmatched 0.9028 0.85261 15.4  21.04 0.000 
  Matched 0.90305 0.89364 2.9 81.3 3.81 0.000 
head_female Unmatched 0.27557 0.27324 0.5  0.74 0.461 
  Matched 0.27367 0.28635 -2.8 -443.3 -3.46 0.001 
nr_HHhabit Unmatched 5.7571 4.6323 58.3  85.46 0.000 
  Matched 5.7578 5.7407 0.9 98.5 0.95 0.340 
children Unmatched 3.2556 2.2518 68.5  101.18 0.000 
  Matched 3.2561 3.2753 -1.3 98.1 -1.36 0.174 
oldest_chi Unmatched 13.418 12.842 17.9  24.61 0.000 
  Matched 13.418 13.387 0.9 94.7 1.19 0.234 




Appendix 1.2 - Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 2004 (One-to-One Matching) 
 Enrollment Attendance 
by age treated controls Diff s.e. t-stat treated controls diff s.e. t-stat 
6-9 years 95.41% 92.34% 3.07% 0.006 5.03 2.19 2.78 -0.59 0.152 -3.88 
10-17 years 93.88% 89.17% 4.71% 0.005 9.95 2.64 2.80 -0.17 0.119 -4.76 
 diff t-stat diff t-stat 
younger vs. older -1.64%  3.36 *** -0.42  -2.20 ** 
by gender 
male 93.15% 87.00% 6.15% 0.01 10.67 2.68 2.88 -0.20 0.14 -1.38 
female 95.56% 91.53% 4.03% 0.00 8.24 2.33 2.80 -0.47 0.13 -3.58 
 diff t-stat diff t-stat 
Male-Female 2.12%  2.81 *** 0.27  1.40  
by area 
rural 93.47% 86.37% 7.10% 0.01 6.97 2.33 2.83 -0.51 0.23 -2.21 
urban 94.58% 89.99% 4.59% 0.00 10.48 2.56 2.72 -0.16 0.11 -1.50 
 diff t-stat diff t-stat 
rural-urban 2.51%  2.26 ** -0.34  -1.36  
by region 
N 93.85% 87.89% 5.96% 0.010 5.96 1.87 2.00 -0.12 0.148 -0.84 
NE 95.02% 89.95% 5.07% 0.006 8.48 3.00 3.42 -0.43 0.191 -2.24 
SE 94.43% 90.03% 4.40% 0.008 5.47 2.07 2.61 -0.53 0.211 -2.53 
S 92.15% 90.35% 1.80% 0.011 1.58 2.46 2.45 0.00 0.193 0.02 
Midwest 94.23% 90.92% 3.31% 0.012 2.79 1.87 2.13 -0.26 0.194 -1.36 
 diff t-stat diff t-stat 
N-S 4.16%  2.74  -0.30  - 0.52  
NE- S 3.27%  2.53  -0.43  - 1.59  
SE- S 2.60%  1.86  -0.54  - 1.88 ** 
Midwest - S 1.50%  0.91  -0.27  - 0.98  




Appendix 1.3 - Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Gender 
Heterogeneous shocks by gender 
Matching  Enrollment Attendance 
  treated controls diff s.e. t-stat treated controls diff s.e. t-stat 
Male 
  92.83% 1.82 
OO 92.31% 87.51% 4.80% 0.01 9.18 1.94 2.30 -0.37 0.08 -4.64 
NN  92.31% 87.93% 4.38% 0.00 10.91 1.94 2.31 -0.38 0.06 -6.00 
Radius 92.31% 87.94% 4.37% 0.00 12.57 1.94 2.28 -0.34 0.06 -6.18 
Kernel 92.31% 87.95% 4.36% 0.00 12.72 1.94 2.27 -0.33 0.06 -6.02 
Female 
  93.42% 1.70 
OO 94.03% 89.75% 4.28% 0.00 8.63 1.79 2.03 -0.24 0.08 -3.07 
NN  94.03% 89.92% 4.11% 0.00 10.81 1.79 2.03 -0.24 0.06 -3.96 
Radius 94.03% 89.81% 4.22% 0.00 12.78 1.79 2.07 -0.29 0.05 -5.26 
Kernel 94.03% 89.81% 4.22% 0.00 12.89 1.79 2.06 -0.27 0.05 -5.00 
ttest for statistically signifcantly differences: Male-Female 
  diff t-stat diff t-stat 
OO 0.52%   0.72   -0.13   1.14   
NN  0.27%   0.48   -0.13   1.51 * 
Radius 0.15%   0.30   -0.06   0.76   
Kernel 0.14%   0.30   -0.06   0.82   




Appendix 1.4 - Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Age 
Heterogeneous shocks by age group 
Matching  Enrollment Attendance 
  treated controls diff s.e. t-stat treated controls diff s.e. t-stat 
6-9 years 
OO 96.00% 91.99% 4.02% 0.005 7.62 1.85 2.39 -0.54 0.094 -5.79 
NN  96.00% 92.17% 3.83% 0.004 9.99 1.85 2.30 -0.45 0.071 -6.30 
Radius 96.00% 92.32% 3.68% 0.003 11.25 1.85 2.23 -0.38 0.064 -5.89 
10-17 years 
OO 91.73% 87.47% 4.26% 0.005 9.09 1.87 2.14 -0.27 0.070 -3.82 
NN  91.73% 87.58% 4.15% 0.004 11.30 1.87 2.14 -0.27 0.055 -4.94 
Radius 91.73% 87.70% 4.03% 0.003 12.46 1.87 2.15 -0.28 0.050 -5.61 
ttest for statistically significantyl differneces: Primary-Secondary (6-10 vs 10-17) 
  diff t-stat diff t-stat 
OO 0.00 -0.35  -0.27   -2.33  *** 
NN  0.00 -0.59  -0.18   -1.96  ** 
Radius 0.00 -0.76  -0.10   -1.20    




Appendix 1.5- Heterogeneous Treatment Effect by Region - 2006 
Heterogeneous shocks by region 
Matching  Enrollment Attendance 
  treated controls diff s.e. t-stat treated controls diff s.e. t-stat 
North 
  91.45 1.65 
no Matching  92.19% 91.40% 0.81% 0 1.64 1.87 1.54 0.33 0.08 4.33 
OO 92.19% 88.49% 3.70% 0.008 4.49 1.87 2.13 -0.26 0.128 -2.02 
NN  92.19% 88.43% 3.77% 0.006 5.9 1.87 2.09 -0.22 0.102 -2.12 
Radius 92.19% 88.00% 4.19% 0.006 7.27 1.87 2.08 -0.21 0.092 -2.26 
Kernel 92.19% 88.02% 4.17% 0.006 7.3 1.87 2.11 -0.24 0.092 -2.56 
NE 
  92.76 1.88 
no Matching  93.72% 92.42% 1.30% 0 4.4 1.88 1.88 0 0.05 -0.02 
OO 93.72% 89.40% 4.32% 0.006 7.52 1.88 2.09 -0.21 0.096 -2.23 
NN  93.72% 88.69% 5.03% 0.004 11.18 1.88 2.23 -0.21 0.078 -4.5 
Radius 93.72% 88.45% 5.27% 0.004 12.91 1.88 2.22 -0.21 0.072 -4.68 
Kernel 93.72% 88.49% 5.23% 0.004 13.07 1.88 2.19 -0.21 0.071 -4.4 
SE 
  94.45 1.84 
no Matching  93.10% 95.06% -2.06% 0 -5.85 1.87 1.82 0.05 0.06 0.92 
OO 93.10% 91.12% 1.98% 0.007 2.73 1.86 2.18 -0.32 0.108 -2.94 
NN  93.10% 90.71% 2.39% 0.006 4.27 1.86 2.16 -0.29 0.082 -3.53 
Radius 93.10% 90.70% 2.40% 0.005 4.99 1.86 2.15 -0.29 0.074 -3.84 
Kernel 93.10% 90.71% 2.39% 0.005 5.03 1.86 2.15 -0.28 0.073 -3.83 
South 
  92.89 1.65 
no Matching  91.03% 93.65% -2.79% 0.01 -4.79 1.85 1.6 0.25 0.08 3.13 
OO 91.03% 89.83% 1.20% 0.008 1.07 1.85 1.98 -0.14 0.155 -0.88 
NN  91.03% 88.94% 2.09% 0.009 2.3 1.85 2.05 -0.21 0.123 -1.68 
Radius 91.03% 88.97% 2.06% 0.008 2.57 1.85 1.97 -0.14 0.112 -1.2 
Kernel 91.03% 89.00% 2.02% 0.008 2.6 1.85 1.95 -0.11 0.109 -0.97 
Midwest 
  93.77 1.48 
No Matching  94.31% 93.98% 0.27% 0.01 0.45 1.73 1.41 0.33 0.09 3.79 
OO 94.31% 93.26% 1.05% 0.009 1.16 1.75 1.67 0.08 0.144 0.56 
NN  94.31% 91.73% 2.58% 0.007 3.52 1.75 1.62 0.13 0.114 1.16 
Radius 94.31% 91.56% 2.75% 0.007 4.21 1.75 1.58 0.17 0.107 1.59 
Kernel 94.31% 91.70% 2.61% 0.006 4.08 1.75 1.59 0.16 0.106 1.54 
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Appendix 2.1- Regression by Treatment – Chapter 2 
  
Number of slides correctly positioned: Random Effects 
panel regression 
Number of points contributed:  
Tobit random effects panel regression - marginal effects reported 
(dy/dx) 
  
Random leader Skilful leader 
  
Random leader Skilful leader 
Coeff. Coeff. dy/dx dy/dx 
out-group -9.054** -7.430* -0.456 0.792  -7.810*** -5.468*** -6.100** -4.962** 
 -3.975 -4.336 -0.999 -1.333  -2.409 -1.911 -2.597 -2.243 
Contribution (t-
1) 
 0.0414  0.00806      
  -0.0275  -0.0148      
Period  0.303***  0.214*      






































































Multiplier (t-1)       6.345***  5.067*** 
       -1.851  -1.778 
Leaders' 
Ability  
0.818*** 0.841*** 1.114*** 1.166***  -0.0395 -0.102 -1.035*** -0.908*** 
 -0.266 -0.274 -0.321 -0.325  -0.114 -0.107 -0.232 -0.239 
Identity control 0.118 0.126 -0.406 -0.454  0.0748 0.000961 -0.0567 -0.0255 
 -0.3 -0.312 -0.306 -0.321  -0.198 -0.184 -0.201 -0.201 
Session 
dummies 
         
1 -2.395 -2.773   
 
-0.216 0.0178   
 -2.805 -3.211   
 
-2.148 -1.969   
2 4.473 4.905   
 
7.096*** 6.139***   
 -3.025 -3.391   
 
-2.442 -2.284   
3   4.351*** 4.693*** 
 
  -5.091** -4.620** 
   -1.661 -1.786 
 
  -2.296 -2.323 
4   2.255 2.491 
 
  -6.684*** -5.704** 
   -1.94 -2.041 
 
  -2.423 -2.454 
5 -8.705* -9.122*   
 
-0.0713 0.983   
 -5.115 -5.327   
 
-2.26 -2.094   
6 -7.015** -7.309**   
 
-1.523 0.289   
 -2.932 -3.448   
 
-2.239 -2.084   
7 3.126 3.338   
 
4.865** 4.116*   
 -2.942 -3.245   
 
-2.46 -2.286   
8 -4.316 -4.404   
 
-1.73 -0.563   
 -3.025 -3.341   
 
-1.988 -1.836   
9   7.824*** 8.236*** 
 
  -12.85*** -10.43*** 
   -2.73 -2.827 
 
  -3.001 -3.073 
10 6.217* 6.677*   
 
6.450** 5.257**   
 -3.25 -3.608   
 
-2.531 -2.38   
11   5.166** 5.891** 
 
  -9.180*** -7.834*** 
   -2.296 -2.404 
 
  -2.803 -2.83 
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12 9.420** 9.727**   
 
3.393 2.964   
 -3.785 -3.924   
 
-2.506 -2.348   
13   6.283*** 6.744*** 
 
  -4.300* -3.864* 
   -2.178 -2.391 
 
  -2.32 -2.341 
14   4.253 3.828 
 
  4.765** 4.000* 
   -2.855 -2.978 
 
  -2.347 -2.371 
15 -11.35** -10.95**   
 
-6.403*** -3.643*   
 -4.76 -5.057   
 
-2.147 -2.046   
16   -0.476 -0.768 
 
  0.934 1.008 
   -1.463 -1.588 
 
  -2.34 -2.337 
17   3.500*** 3.966*** 
 
  -3.341 -2.455 
   -0.49 -0.551 
 
  -2.557 -2.569 
18   -1.371 -2.027 
 
  5.421** 4.582* 
   -2.317 -2.669 
 
  -2.33 -2.344 
19   6.770** 6.571** 
 
  3.222 2.312 
   -2.927 -2.995 
 
  -2.346 -2.368 
     
 
    
20 -7.488* -6.807   
 
-5.243** -2.819   
 -4.417 -4.764   
 
-2.219 -2.072   
23 -0.821 -0.687   
 
5.121* 4.921*   
 
-3.376 -3.619   
 
-2.844 -2.621   
26 5.259 5.267   
 
4.042 3.419   
 
-3.504 -3.737   
 
-2.819 -2.608   
 
    
 
    
27 1.646 2.1   
 
-0.306 -0.266   
 
-4.65 -5.061   
 
-2.429 -2.228   
 
    
 
    
28 -0.00319 0.405   
 
2.214 1.843   
 
-2.845 -3.022   
 
-3.472 -3.189   
_cons 6.285 3.142 -0.162 -2.256      
  -4.956 -5.386 -4.874 -5.187           








Appendix 2.2 - Pooled Regression – Chapter 2  
  
Effort: RE panel regession   
Contribution: Tobit random effects panel 
regression - marginal effects reported 
  -1 -2   -3 -4 











-3.691 -4.112 dy/dx -1.753 -1.752 
   
skilled 





   
Out-group=1 5.090* 3.746 












    
5.486*** 
























     
-0.048 
Leaders' Ability 0.839*** 0.859*** 
 
-0.207** -0.239** 
Identity Control  -0.219 -0.226 
 
-0.102 -0.099 

















































































































































































_cons 8.851* 7.135 
   
 
-4.603 -4.979 
   
N 870 783   2610 2349 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
="* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01" 





Appendix 2.3 - Regression by Effort-Support Area (Robustness Checks) 
  Contribution (interaction terms included but not reported) 
  Random leader Skilful leader 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  no support strict support support no support strict support support 
out-group -5.468*** -3.780 -4.291* -4.962** -11.24*** -4.649*** 
 
(-2.86) (-1.22) (-1.70) (-2.21) (-24.15) (-2.69) 
Contribution (t-1) 0.114*** 0.0274 0.0691** 0.141*** -0.00578 0.0863** 
 
(6.01) (0.74) (2.33) (6.83) (-0.13) (2.38) 
Multiplier (t-1) 6.345*** 5.944 10.87*** 5.067*** 10.90* 11.00** 
 
(3.43) (1.21) (2.93) (2.85) (1.83) (2.12) 
Period -0.299*** -0.395*** -0.305*** -0.0738 -0.149* -0.0290 
 
(-6.91) (-5.01) (-4.48) (-1.51) (-1.82) (-0.39) 
Leaders' Ability YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Identity control YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Session dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1296 432 594 1053 243 324 
t statistics in parentheses 
       * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Welcome! Thanks for participating in our experiment.  Please turn off mobile phones and any 
other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of this session. During 
the experiment, please do not talk to any of the other participants. All interaction with others will 
be via the computer. Feel free to ask questions at any time during the experiment. Raise your 
hand and a monitor will come to you. 
 
In this experiment you will have the possibility to earn some money. The amount you earn will 
depend on your decision and the decisions of the other participants in your group. You will be 
paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will refer to 
experimental points. Each experimental point is the equivalent of 0.04 Euro. Hence, 100 
experimental points are equivalent to four Euros.   
100 points =4 Euro 
All decisions are completely anonymous and your identity will not be revealed to anyone in the 
experiment or outside the experiment.    
 
Procedures 
The experiment consists of three tasks. Each task has its own instructions that should be read in 
steps. We will indicate which page you should read when. Wait for our indication.   
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At the beginning of the experiment, participants are divided in 4 groups of 4 participants.  Half 
of the groups are blue and the other half is green. The group color remains constant through the 




The first task is a group task. The group task is only completely solved when ALL 
participants of your group typed in the solution. During the task your group participants will 
be able to chat with the member of your group and find together a solution. The chat box is 
positioned on the left side of the computer screen. You have 10 minutes to solve the task during 
which you can communicate with your group members. Please be aware that you need to type 
all the solutions your group found and press “ok” before the 10 minutes runs out.  
All participants are presented a figure and a list of objects. The task is to find the hidden objects 
in the figure. The top and left hand side of the figure contains the identification numbers of the 
rows (Reihe) and columns (Spalte), respectively. You need to enter this information in the boxes 
that appear on the right hand side of the screen.   












Figure      Screen 
 
 
The group that finds more objects during 10 minutes will be the winning group. At the end of the 
experiment you will know if you belonged to the winning group as a congratulations message 







You are presented with a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be 
moved as far as 100. Your task is to position the slider at exactly 50. Each slider has a number to 
its right showing its current position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to move each 
slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. The number of 
points you have accumulated at any moment is displayed on the top of the screen. This task will 
be performed as a test trial and subsequently will be performed for 1 round.  You will have 60 
seconds to solve the task.  Below an example: 
 
 
a. First position     b. positioned at  50  




A participant is randomly selected as leader. The leader is presented with a new slider screen for 
1 minute.  His task is to position the slider in 50 using the mouse.  The more sliders the leader 
positioned correctly, the higher the payment for each group member. Though, the payment of the 
leader is fixed. The leader receives 25 points each round. Only the leader knows the exact 
number of sliders he positions correctly. The leader will also have the option to solve another 
task based on task I (See Appendix II). Hence, this is completely independent and has no effect 
on the results of the experiment.  
Group members who have not been selected as leaders receive 20 experimental points, which we 
will refer to as endowment. The task is to decide how to distribute the endowment between two 
accounts: a private account and a group account. For each point that you keep in your private 
account you receive one point back. For each point invested in the group account you and 
other group members get a payment. The payment that is received depends on the amount of 
sliders that the leader positions correctly as follows: 
 . 
Table 1  
Number of sliders correctly positioned 
by the leader 
Multiplier to each group member 
Less than 6 0.3 
Between 6 and 8 0.4 
Between 9 and 16 0.5 
Between 17 and 20 0.6 
More than 20 0.8 
 
This stage lasts between 10 and 15 rounds, the actual ending point is randomly determined. You 





While the leader is positioning the sliders you will be asked how many sliders you expect the 
leader to position correctly. If you guess correctly, you will receive 4 points. For one unit 
difference from the actual value you will receive 1 point less. For two units difference you will 
receive 3 points less. And for 3 units difference you will receive no payment. 
The leader will also be asked how many points he expects other participants to invest in the 
group account. If the leader guesses correctly, he/she will receive 4 points. For one unit 
difference from the actual value he/she will receive 1 point less. For two units difference he/she 





Private account  + Group account X Multiplier = total payment 
 
Example  
Suppose you invest 12 points in your private account and that in total 20 points were invested in 
the group account. If the leader positions 18 sliders correctly, then your payment is: 
 
Private account   +  Group account    X Multiplier  =    total 
payment 
= 12   +   20   X  0.6 
= 12   +  12     =    24 
 
Suppose you invest 4 Points in the private account and that in total 50 points were invested in the 
group account. If the leader positions 7 Sliders correctly, then your payment is: 
  
Private account   +  Group account    X Multiplier  =    total 
payment 
= 4   +   50   X  0.4 
= 4   +  20     =    24 
 
In the next screen you will need to solve understanding questions. Please click on “ok” once you 
are ready.  
 
Questions  




1. How many points will each group member receive from the group 
account if the leader positions 7 sliders correctly?  
 
2. Further assume that you invest 10 points in the private account. How 
many points would you receive from the private account?  
 
3. What is your total payment?                                                                        





Appendix 3.1- Instructions to Experiment 2 - Chapter 3 
Instructions 
 
Welcome! Thanks for participating in our experiment.  Please turn off mobile phones and any 
other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of this session. During 
the experiment, please do not talk to any of the other participants. All interaction with others will 
be via the computer. Feel free to ask questions at any time during the experiment. Raise your 
hand and a monitor will come to you. 
 
In this experiment you will have the possibility to earn some money. The amount you earn will 
depend on your decision and the decisions of the other participants in your group. You will be 
paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment we will refer to 
experimental points. Each experimental point is equivalent to 0.025 Euro. Hence, 100 
experimental points are equivalent to 2.5 Euros. 
100 points=2.5 Euros 
Besides you will receive 2 Euros corresponding to show up fee. 
All decisions are completely anonymous and your identity will not be revealed to anyone in or 
outside the experiment.    
 
Procedures 
The experiment consists of four task. Each task has its own instructions that should be read in 
steps. We will indicate which page you should read and when. Please wait for our indication and 




 At the beginning of this task, participants are divided in groups of 3. Each group receives either 
a blue or a green color.  The group color remains constant through the experiment.       
You will receive two pictures. Your task is to find the differences between them. The group that 
finds more differences will be the winning group. Groups compete against groups of different 
color, hence participants in Green groups will be competing against participants in Blue groups. 
During the task, you and other participants in the group will be able to chat with each other to 
exchange information using a chat box that is placed on the left side of the computer screen. 
Messages from other members will be displaced above and you will have the chance to write on 
the cell below. On the top of the screen you will see how many seconds are left before the task 
finishes. The group that finds together more differences between the two figures during 10 
minutes will be the winning group. At the end of the experiment you will know if you belonged 
to the winning group as a congratulations message will appear. Please note that the solution 
would only be considered correct if all participants in the group have typed it. From each 
solution that was typed in wrongly, 1 point  will be discounted. Please be also aware that 
you need to press “ok” before the 10 minutes runs out.  
The figure below presents an example of the figures that you will observe.  The figure on the left 








Printed figure    Computer screen 
 
 
The rows of the printed figure are marked with numbers while the columns are marked with 
letters. The combination of the Letter and number indicate the location of the object. The task of 
your group is to find the differences between the figures and type in the number of differences 
that you found in each cell. For example, in the figure below you see that the flag is different in 
both pictures. The flag is located in column A and row 3, so, the correct answer will be 1.  
On the right hand side of the computer screen you will receive a table with the same coordinates 
as the printed figure (see a sample on the left hand side of the figure above). Your task is to enter 
the number of differences that you found for a particular cell in the picture. Following the 
example, you should enter the number 1 in the cell corresponding to the coordinates A3.  





One participant in the group will be randomly selected as leader while the other two participants 
will conform the group.  A message in the screen will announce your role in the group. 
 
Similarly as in the previous exercise, you will be presented with five two digit numbers.  Your 
task is to sum them up.  You are not allowed to use any calculator that helps you solving the 
task.  After entering the value and pressing ok 5 more numbers are displayed.  You have 30 
seconds to solve the task.  
 
After solving this task, participants will receive 20 points.  The task is to decide how much they 
want to pass to the leader.  The value that they pass to the leader will multiply by A.  The value 
of A depends on two factors:  the performance of the leader in the summing task and luck.  If the 
leader solved less than 1 calculation correctly A would be 0.8. However, if the leader solves 
more than 1 sum correctly A will be a random number between 0.8 and 1.9. The probability that 
A occurs is normally distributed, which means that its higher for values around the mean (1.35) 
and lower for values near to the tales (0.8 and 1.9).The actual value will be determined by luck.  
After the points passed to the leader multiply, the leader will have to decide how to distribute 
them.  Hence the leader can decide how much he wants to pass to each player and how much he 
wants to keep for himself/herself.   The leader will receive 20 points plus the value he/she keeps 
for his/her own. 
 
This stage of the game will repeat for 7 rounds.  Your payment will be the sum of points that you 
accumulate during this stage.  
 
Example  
1. Suppose that participant 1 pass 8 points to the leader.  If the leader solves more than 1 sum 
correctly, and A is 1.5, the value generated with the points passed by participant 1 is 12. If 
the leader decides to take 3 points from participant 1 the payment by participant 1 would be: 
 
Total payment  = Points kept        +  Points  Passed * A    -   Leaders take up   
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  = 12   +  ( 8  X 1.5 )      –     3   
 = 12   +   12                         –     3 =    21 
 
If participant 2 passes 12 points to the leader the value generated with the points passed by him 
would be 18 points.  If the leader takes 2 points from participant 2, the payment to participant 2 
would be: 
 
Total payment  = Points kept  +  Points  Passed * A    -   Leaders take up    
  = 8 +  ( 12  X 1.5)      –     2      
= 8  +  18            –     2 =    24   
 
The leader receives 20 points for solving this task, plus the points he takes from participant 1 and 
2. Hence, the payment to the leader would be: 
 
Total payment  =  20    +   Points  from 1   +  Points from 2  




Assume you are a group member that took following investment decision: Pass 10 points to the 
leader and kept 10 points for you. Please answer following questions:  
 
1. How many points would you receive from the value you kept?  10 
2. How many points would you receive if you pass 10 points and A is 1.5? 3014 
3. How much would you receive from the value you passed if the leader 
takes 3 points from you?                                                                       
1231 
4. What is your total payment? 2133 








In this part of the experiment you are presented with 10 decisions.  Each decision presents two 
options: "Option A" and "Option B." Your task is to indicate in the final column your preferred 
option.   While you will make ten choices and record these in the final column, one of them will 
be used in the end to determine your earnings. After you have made all of your choices, we will 
randomly select one of the decisions for payment.  Each decision has an equal chance of being 
used in the end. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting 
your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. 
 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 200 points one out of 10 times (1/10), 
and it pays 160 points nine out of 10 times (9/10). Option B yields 385 points one out of 10 times 
(1/10), and it pays 10 points nine out of 10 times (9/10).  To determine your payment, a random 
number between 1 to 10 will be selected.  In this example, if number 1 is selected you will 
received either 200 points or 385 points depending on your decision.  If a number between 2 and 




The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the 
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not 
be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 200 
pennies or 385 pennies.   
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose 
between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other 
rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. The computer will select 
a two random numbers. One will determine the decision to pay and the other earnings for the 
Option you chose for that Decision.  
  
 
